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ABSTRACT 
 
Shrimp farming is important to the Vietnamese economy in terms of national income, job 
creation and poverty alleviation. However, shrimp farming is generally technically inefficient 
and probably generates too much pollution. To encourage the sustainable development of the 
Vietnamese shrimp industry, there is a need to improve the productivity of shrimp farms and 
at the same time to reduce the wastewater pollution generated by shrimp farming. The thesis 
has two aims: (1) to estimate the efficiency of shrimp farms in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, 
with a particular focus on the productivity effects of pollution, and (2) to use experimental 
economics to investigate policies that could be used to mitigate the wastewater pollution 
impacting shrimp farms.  
Overall farmers are found to be inefficient, suggesting farmers are using more inputs than 
necessary to produce a given output level. Surprisingly, the average extensive (i.e., less 
capital-intensive) farm is found to be more efficient than the average intensive and semi-
intensive (i.e., more capital-intensive) farms. Furthermore, downstream farms are found to be 
less efficient than upstream farms, suggesting that wastewater pollution influences shrimp 
farming productivity and results in a negative externality.  
Evidence from lab-based experiments suggests that the incentives provided by a monitoring 
and certification agency are not sufficient to promote the full cooperation of shrimp farmers 
to solve the wastewater pollution problem. However, full cooperation was achieved by 
providing farmers with an opportunity to communicate. In both cases, self-governance of 
shrimp farmers was found to be highly effective. The results suggest that community-based 
management is worthy of further investigation as a possible solution to sustainable 
development of the shrimp industry in Vietnam.  
"What we have ignored is what citizens can do and the importance of real involvement of the 
people involved – versus just having somebody in Washington ... make a rule." Elinor Ostrom 
(1933-2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Being born and growing up in a province located in the Mekong River Delta (MRD) 
in Vietnam, I have witnessed an improvement in living standards in my home province as 
well as in the Delta as a whole. At the aggregate level, the livelihood of the people has been 
improved. One of the major contributors to this improvement has been the shrimp industry. 
Shrimp farming has existed in Vietnam for more than 100 years. Initially, shrimp 
farming was practiced extensively, meaning that farmers used only natural seed supply from 
the river system and used no complementary feeding. By the early 1990s, due to pressure on 
land, a decrease in natural shrimp stocks and food, an increase in demand for shrimp 
products, and developments in shrimp farming technology, more intensive shrimp farming 
practices were introduced. Today, intensive, semi-intensive and extensive shrimp farming are 
widely practiced by farmers using artificial seed (e.g., stock from hatcheries), artificial feed, 
and other artificial materials (e.g., chemicals, fertilizers).   
The more intensive the shrimp farm, the more inputs and hence more capital it 
demands. Thus, intensive farmers invest more and expect to generate a higher profit 
compared to semi-intensive and extensive farmers. However, like all farming activities, 
shrimp farming depends on many factors, such as water quality, soil quality and weather. If a 
shrimp crop fails, intensive farmers will suffer greater losses than semi-intensive and 
extensive farmers. Even though the income generated from shrimp farming is 5-10 times 
higher than rice or salt production, shrimp farming is a risky business.  
Undoubtedly, the shrimp industry has proved itself to be an important contributor to 
national income, poverty alleviation and unemployment reduction. It has also attracted much 
attention from governments at the local and national levels. Indeed, a number of regulations, 
ranging from financial to technical support, have been introduced by government authorities 
 
 
2 
in order to promote shrimp production. Shrimp aquaculture expanded enormously in the 
2000s. Moreover, production from the MRD has been the main contributor to growth in 
national shrimp production. 
Despite the obvious strength of the industry at the aggregate level, the industry faces a 
range of problems: financial losses of shrimp farmers (Sinh, 2006), environmental 
degradation and deteriorating shrimp pond water and soil quality (Tho et al., 2008; Thi, 2007; 
Tong et al., 2004), shrimp export losses due to chemical (e.g., antibiotics) contamination and 
not meeting food safety requirements of importing countries (e.g. EU, the US and Japan; 
Lebel et al. 2008), and increased incidence of diseases in shrimp (Johnston et al., 2000). 
Indeed, my personal experience gained during face-to-face interviews with shrimp farmers in 
the provinces of Bac Lieu and Tra Vinh, indicate that farmers have observed more pollution 
in river water, diminished production levels, and greater levels of shrimp disease outbreak 
compared with the earlier years of their farming careers.   
There is a wide-ranging literature on shrimp farming in Vietnam. Previous studies 
have looked at the above issues and found that less efficient farms are more prone to financial 
losses (Ancev et al. 2010), excessive chemical use, unconsumed feed and higher levels of 
waste. Over time pollution to river and soil that has impacted shrimp farms and the 
environment as a whole has been documented (Gozle, 1995; Hung et al., 2005; Joyce et al., 
2006; Tho et al., 2008). It is also clear (Vo, 2003) that shrimp farming is itself having an 
adverse impact on the food safety chain of the final shrimp product. Lastly, a number of 
studies have evaluated technologies to mitigate the pollution generated by shrimp farming 
(Jones et al., 2001; Lin et al., 2005). 
In short, shrimp farming in the MRD as it currently exists does not appear to be 
sustainable from an economic or an environmental point of view. To have a more sustainable 
development of the industry, there is a need to improve productivity and reduce the pollution 
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at the same time. Given technical solutions to wastewater pollution are viable options, it is 
helpful to focus on managerial aspects of pollution in which each farmer needs to practise 
shrimp farming in a more environmentally responsible manner.  
Nonetheless, there is limited in-depth research on the efficiency of shrimp farming in 
the Mekong delta and there is also very limited study on pollution management issues of the 
shrimp farming areas. Thus, the present thesis is aimed at measuring in-depth the efficiencies 
which include technical efficiency, allocative efficiency, scale efficiency and economic 
efficiency, for the three common shrimp farming practices (extensive, semi-intensive, and 
intensive). It also carries out a technical efficiency comparison among the three practices and 
between upstream farms and downstream farms and studies experimentally the cooperative 
behaviour of shrimp farmers in reducing pollution. Specifically, the thesis focuses on finding 
an answer for the following as-yet unanswered questions: 
(1) What are the current efficiency states of the three shrimp farming practices; which is 
the most efficient of the three shrimp practices; and what is the best way to improve 
the productivity of shrimp farmers? 
(2) Given the shrimp farming area in the MRD is geographically isolated from other 
sources of pollution, what is the effect of farm-related pollution on productivity? 
(3) Given viable options for reducing pollution, how will farmers respond to policy 
instruments targeted to solving the pollution problem? In other words, how 
cooperative are the farmers in solving the pollution problem? 
The answers to these questions will lead to a better understanding of shrimp farming 
practices as well as farmers’ behaviour and give directions for improvement. The results 
should also contribute to the aquaculture literature on empirical efficiency comparisons via 
using a meta-frontier approach and to the experimental economics literature on cooperation. 
More specifically, the results will show the level of efficiency for shrimp farming practices of 
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farmers compared to their peers, which gives ways for improving their efficiency technically, 
economically, allocatively, and in terms of scale. Further, using a meta-frontier approach to 
compare efficiency of the three shrimp practices will provide the first empirical evidence for 
the industry as well as policy implications for promoting a more efficient farming practice. 
Moreover, the study is the first to attempt to compare efficiency of relative upstream and 
downstream farms, which reflects to some degree the impact of the pollution externality in 
the MRD region while controlling for a number of key parameters. It also brings 
experimental economics to the fore in the process of designing policies to mitigate the 
pollution facing shrimp farmers. Experimentation of policy instruments chosen to be more 
appropriate to the context of Vietnam will give the efficacy of the instruments and hence 
policy implications contributing to the management aspect of pollution. In brief, the thesis in 
general should take the form of policy recommendations for a more sustainable development 
of the industry in the region.   
  The rest of the thesis comprises three main chapters and a conclusion. In Chapter 2, 
using data envelopment analysis for group-frontier and meta-frontier estimation, efficiency 
measures of the 3 shrimp practices and a comparison of efficiencies is performed. Then, the 
factors affecting efficiency at shrimp farms, including the effect of pollution, are analysed. 
The main results in this chapter suggest that farmers are not efficient, that extensive farming 
is the most efficient practice, and that the pollution externality is reflected in a lower 
productivity of downstream farms.  
Chapter 3 studies the possibility of using an agency as a solution to a public “bad” 
problem as well as examining the possibility for self-governance of shrimp farmers. We 
investigate the use of a central agency as an incentive to foster cooperative behaviour among 
farmers in reducing pollution and to determine the conditions under which cooperation is 
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attained and sustained. The results indicate that an agency is not sufficient to promote full 
cooperation but that self-governance is possible to some extent.  
In Chapter 4, the effect of communication on the cooperation of farmers is 
investigated experimentally. Interestingly, without using the agency proposed in Chapter 3, 
shrimp farmers manage to attain full cooperation via communication and self-governance is 
found to be robust. This suggests the possibility of a community-based solution to the 
pollution problem. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in Chapter 5.       
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CHAPTER 2: EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS AND THE EFFECT OF 
POLLUTION ON SHRIMP FARMS 
2.1. Introduction 
The areas and production levels of Vietnamese shrimp farms have been increasing 
dramatically in recent years. This has contributed greatly to the national economy of 
Vietnam, poverty alleviation and job creation (Estelles et al., 2002). Shrimp aquaculture grew 
steadily from 324,100ha in 2000 to 633,400ha in 2007. Over the period 1994-2008, the 
fisheries production of the whole country and the MRD grew, respectively, from 1,450,000 
tons and 825,000 tons in 1994 to 4,574,900 tons and 2,311,000 tons in 2008 (Nguyen and 
Sumalde, 2008 & Vu and Don, 2010). The MRD fishery contributes up to 50 percent of the 
national fishery and more than 60 percent of the annual export value of aquatic products from 
Vietnam (Nguyen and Sumalde, 2008 & Vu and Don, 2010). Sinh’s (2006) survey also 
shows that in 2003 fisheries and aquaculture contributed 8.1 percent and 29.2 percent, 
respectively, to the agricultural sector’s share of Vietnam’s GDP and to the MRD’s GDP. For 
farmed shrimp production, the national volume reached 238,000 tons in 2003, a 54 percent 
increase over 2001 (155,000 tons), contributing 77 percent of the increase to national farmed 
shrimp output. The data also show that farmed shrimp production in the MRD plays a key 
role in the shrimp industry of Vietnam (Nguyen and Sumalde, 2008).  
Black tiger shrimp (Peneaus monodon) is the dominant species and 90% of brackish 
shrimp farming in Vietnam takes place in the MRD (Pham et al. 2010). There are typically 
three modes of shrimp farm production: intensive, semi-intensive, and extensive. The modes 
are divided, according to their stocking densities and the extent of management over grow-
out parameters. Table 1 shows key distinguishing features of the three modes of production.  
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Extensive shrimp aquaculture is primarily used in areas with limited infrastructure 
and few highly trained aquaculture specialists. In that type of environment, individual or 
family group producers, who generally lack access to credit, are able to set up their operation 
with few inputs and little technical know-how. Disease outbreaks are rare, due to low 
stocking densities and low supplementary feeding. 
Semi-intensive cultivation involves stocking densities beyond those that the natural 
environment can sustain without additional inputs. Consequently these systems depend on a 
reliable shrimp post-larva supply, and a greater management intervention in the pond’s 
operation compared with extensive ponds. The risk of crop failure increases with increasing 
farming intensity. 
Intensive farms involve a smaller pond size, a higher stocking density, higher inputs, 
and adequate infrastructure. The risk of disease can be serious in intensive culture, especially 
if water discharge from one pond or farm is used by another pond or farm. 
Nguyen and Sumalde (2008) estimate that the MRD has a strong comparative 
advantage in producing and exporting shrimp, having an average domestic resource cost 
ratio1 of 0.17, and that intensive shrimp farms have a higher comparative advantage than 
semi-intensive farms.  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The domestic resource cost ratio is defined as the opportunity costs of domestic resources spent for a unit of 
foreign exchange earned from exporting commodities produced domestically or saved by substituting for 
imports (Bruno 1972). 
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Table 1. Farming practices for intensive, semi-intensive and extensive shrimp aquaculture.  
Parameter Extensive Semi-intensive Intensive 
Aeration  No Yes Yes 
Disease problems Rare Moderate to frequent Frequent 
Feed source Natural + formulated Formulated + natural Formulated 
Fertilisers Yes Yes Yes 
Pond size (ha) 1-10 1-2 0.1-1 
Stocking Natural + artificial Artificial Artificial 
Stocking density 
(seed/m2) 
1-10 10-30 30-50 
Seed source Wild + hatchery Hatchery + wild Hatchery 
Water exchange Tidal + pumping <10% 
daily 
Pumping < 25% 
daily 
Pumping >30% daily 
Source: Alday-Sanz (2010) and Pham et al. (2010) 
Despite the obvious strength of the industry, some shrimp farmers experience 
financial losses and shrimp farming generally may have a negative impact on the 
environment.  Sinh (2006) reports that 30 percent of shrimp farms experience financial 
losses. Tho et al. (2008) report that in the Ca Mau province there are problems of salinity and 
sodicity (excessive sodium in the soil) resulting from shrimp farming, which in turn 
negatively affects shrimp production. Ancev et al. (2010) report that less technically efficient 
shrimp farms are more likely to experience financial losses. Among the three modes of 
shrimp farming, which is more efficient than others? In principal, intensive and semi-
intensive shrimp farms use more inputs and hence produce more output than extensive farms. 
Thus, it is commonly thought that intensive and semi-intensive shrimp farms can generate 
more income for growers. However, from an economic perspective, as yet there is no 
definitive answer to the question of which shrimp farming practice is the most efficient. 
Using meta-frontier approach, this chapter empirically compares the efficiencies of the three 
practices and hence answers the question.  
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In 2002, the Vietnamese Ministry of Fisheries issued a decree (04/2002/QD-BTS) 
regulating shrimp farming activities. According to the decree, all shrimp farming regions 
must be isolated from other sources of pollution such as industrial, agricultural and residential 
waste. Thus, given that in some areas in the MRD nothing other than shrimp farming is 
practiced, we assume that shrimp farms are not affected by any activities except other shrimp 
farms. It is common that the more intensive a shrimp farm, the more polluting it becomes. A 
study by Golze (1995) shows that shrimp farming deteriorates water quality and soil of 
shrimp ponds due to the presence of acid sulphate. Consequently, this has negative impacts 
on shrimp production. Many shrimp farmers dump wastewater, which is typically 
contaminated with waste, chemicals, unconsumed feed and even diseases, into rivers. 
Downstream shrimp farmers may pump the contaminated water from rivers for use in their 
grow-out ponds. Since water quality is essential to shrimp production, it is likely that 
downstream farms would be more affected by pollution compared to upstream farms. Thus, 
the central empirical question is whether there is any difference between technical efficiency 
of downstream farms and upstream farms while controlling for a number of key factors. This 
question has remained unanswered in the literature and the answer to this question would 
give some suggestive evidence of pollution impact on downstream farm.  
To obtain a better understanding of these issues, the present chapter has two goals.  
First, we estimate technical efficiency (TE) with respect to group frontiers and meta-frontiers 
(for comparing TE across the three practices) of shrimp farms in selected areas in the MRD. 
To gain a clearer picture of shrimp farming technology, allocative efficiency (AE), scale 
efficiency (SE) and cost efficiency (CE, also known as economic efficiency) with respect to 
the group frontiers are also estimated. Second, we compare the TE of upstream and 
downstream farms. In line with this, we also investigate the correlations between TE and the 
socio-economic characteristics of shrimp farmers.  
 
 
10 
Thus, this chapter contributes to the aquaculture literature by empirically comparing 
efficiency among the three shrimp practices and investigating the effect of pollution on the 
productivity of downstream farms compared to upstream farms.  The rest of the chapter 
proceeds along the following lines. The next section reviews the literature on productivity 
measurement and related studies of aquaculture, including shrimp farms. The following 
sections discuss our methodology, data, and results. We finish with a discussion of the 
implications of our results and some concluding remarks.     
2.2. Literature Review 
Much work has been done developing the theory and measurement of productivity. A 
deterministic production frontier, also known as a non-stochastic or nonparametric 
production frontier, is constructed by linear programming techniques; a stochastic production 
frontier is estimated using econometric techniques. Attempts to measure production frontiers 
empirically begin with Farrell (1957). Subsequently, this method forms the basis of the data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) method developed by Charnes et al. (1978). The stochastic 
frontier (SF) originated in the work of Aigner et al. (1977), was extended by Meeusen and 
van den Broeck (1997). DEA and SF are extensively used (Sharma et al., 2003). Because the 
stochastic frontier approach involves econometric estimation, it requires an assumption about 
the underlying functional form. On the other hand, DEA uses the ‘best-performing 
observations’ (known as decision making units, or DMUs) to arrive at the frontier, so there is 
no assumption required for the underlying technology or distribution of the inefficiency term 
and, hence, technologies with multiple inputs and outputs can be easily handled. 
Additionally, DEA is a better approach for spatial data (Behrooz et al. 2010). In this study, 
accordingly, we use DEA to analyse the spatial data collected from different provinces.  
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Fare et al. (2004) introduce an index number of environmental performance that can 
be computed using DEA techniques. The index measures the degree to which a DMU has 
succeeded in producing good output while simultaneously accounting for reductions in bad 
inputs. However, this approach is not employed in this chapter since bad outputs (i.e. 
pollution levels) of individual shrimp farms are not readily available and prohibitively costly 
to measure. 
Hayami and Ruttan (1971) first defined the meta-production function as the envelope 
of neoclassical production functions. From this, Battese and Rao (2002), Battese et al. (2004) 
and O’Donnell et al. (2008) define the meta-frontier to be the frontier of the unrestricted 
production set and propose a framework for estimation. The meta-frontier allows a 
comparison of technical efficiencies across firms using different technologies or in different 
regions and can be estimated by parametric or non-parametric approaches.  
Table 2 briefly reports the efficiency results of previous studies on aquaculture using 
either the SF or DEA approach. All studies find that there is room for efficiency 
improvements, meaning that there no cases where all the farms are technically efficient. In 
fact, farmers applying the same technology can differ in their performance and hence the 
production outcomes can vary widely: the average TE scores of the studies range from 0.46 
to 0.93. While the papers reported in Table 2 study the TE of aquaculture in many different 
countries, there are no papers comparing TE across different technologies (via meta-frontier 
approach) for the same aquaculture product (e.g., shrimp or fish). 
 
 
 
 
12 
Table 2. Summary of some previous studies using group-frontier on the efficiency of some 
aquaculture goods 
Author(s) Year Country Commodity Method  TE estimate (group-frontier) 
Sharma et al. 1998 Nepal Carp  SF 0.77 
Iinuma et al. 1999 Malaysia Carp SF 0.42 
Sharma 1999 Pakistan Carp  SF Intensive/Semi : 0.67 
Extensive           : 0.56 
Dey et al. 2000 Philippines Tilapia SF 0.83 
Chiang et al. 2004 Taiwan Milkfish  SF 0.82 
Kumar et al. 2004 India Shrimp SF 0.69 
Ancev et al. 2010 Vietnam Shrimp SF Intensive/Semi : 0.71 
Extensive           : 0.47 
Poulomi 2008 India Shrimp SF Intensive/Semi : 0.61 
Extensive           : 0.49 
Reddy et al. 2008 India Shrimp SF 0.93 
Singh 2008 India Fish SF Type I: .6869; Type II:.6543 
All: .6838  
Singh et al. 2009 India Fish SF 0.66 
Sousa-Junior 
et al. 
2004 Brazil Shrimp DEA TE=0.68; AE=0.61; SE=0.68 
Sharma et al. 1999 China Fish DEA 0.74 
Mehmet et al. 2006 Turkey  Trout DEA TE=0.82; AE=0.83; CE=0.68 
Hoof et al. 2005 Netherlands Fish DEA 0.84 
Devi 2004 India Shrimp DEA and SF Semi-Intensive : 0.79-0.91 
Extensive           : 0.52-0.88 
Huy et al. 2009 Vietnam Shrimp DEA 0.83 
Behrooz et al. 2010 Iran Trout DEA 0.66 
Pham 2010 Vietnam Shrimp DEA 0.36 
 
Studies on the technical efficiency of shrimp farming in Vietnam are very limited. 
Ancev et al. (2010) use the stochastic production frontier approach to analyze the technical 
efficiency of intensive/semi-intensive and extensive farms using 193 observations (surveyed 
in 2004) in the province of Bac Lieu. The results suggest that less technically efficient farms 
are prone to more substantial financial losses. The estimated TE scores of the two shrimp 
production modes with respect to the group-frontier are not comparable since the two group-
frontiers have different benchmarks. However, the authors conclude that intensive/semi-
intensive shrimp farmers are more technically efficient than extensive farmers.  
 A second paper, by Huy (2009), studies the technical efficiency of 64 shrimp farmers 
in the province of Khanh Hoa. Using the DEA method, Huy (2009) finds that farmers are 
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highly technically efficient. However, the studied area is not representative of the shrimp 
industry in Vietnam since its contribution to national shrimp yield is much smaller compared 
to that of the MRD. Moreover, Huy (2009) does not study the TE of semi-intensive and 
extensive farms. 
 Lastly, the paper by Pham (2010) focuses on technical efficiency of 92 extensive 
shrimp farms in Ca Mau province. Using DEA, the author finds that extensive farmers are 
highly inefficient, with an average TE of 0.36. However, the paper does not cover TE of 
intensive and semi-intensive shrimp farms. 
 To fill in the gaps in the literature, the present chapter contributes partly to the 
aquaculture literature, and especially to the literature on the shrimp industry, by carrying out 
an efficiency comparison of the three different technologies.  The meta-frontier approach 
developed by Battese and Rao (2002), Battese et al. (2004) and O’Donnell et al. (2008) 
allows comparing the efficiencies of firms classified into different technological groups. This 
approach has been used extensively in the literature to evaluate the efficiency of groups of 
firms in industries as wide-ranging as education (e.g. McMillan and Chan 2004, Worthington 
and Lee 2005), finance (e.g. Kontolaimou and Tsekouras 2010) and agriculture (e.g. Chen 
and Song 2008, O’Donnell et al. 2008). This technique has not yet been applied to 
aquaculture data and, as such, this chapter represents pioneering work.   
 A measure of TE for a DMU may be used by the decision-maker as an indicator of 
potential efficiency gains as well as by policy-makers interested in industry-wide 
productivity. Moreover, correlations between TE scores and socio-economic factors, such as 
age, experience, education and so on, may suggest to the policy-maker potential links to 
raising productivity. Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993) summarize the socio-economic factors 
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related to technical efficiency in third world agriculture from previous studies. While the 
factors vary from paper to paper, the most common are education, experience, and farm size.  
Factors related to TE in aquaculture from previous studies are also similar to those in 
agriculture. Dey et al. (2000) show that total farm area, education, and age of the farmers are 
positively related to the TE of tilapia production in the Philippines. Similarly, Mehmet et al. 
(2006) discover that smaller trout farms, especially pond farms, are relatively more 
technically and economically efficient. Ancev et al. (2010) suggest that experience in shrimp 
farming and the level of education attained by farmers affect the technical efficiency of 
shrimp farms. Thamrong et al. (2003) find that the age and education level of the household 
head and the proportion of female labour employed have positive effects on technical 
efficiency in shrimp production, while experience, ownership of land and the extension 
agency as a source of knowledge have negative influences. Reddy et al. (2008) suggest that 
age of the respondent, stocking density, and farm size all are factors affecting the estimated 
technical efficiency of shrimp production. Finally, Singh et al. (2009) find that a farmer’s 
experience and non-farm income have a negative impact on the TE of small-scale fish 
production while education and seed quality have a positive effect on TE. The present chapter 
also investigates the relationship between socio-economic factors and TE.  
2.3. Methodology  
2.3.1. Estimating Technical Efficiency, Allocative Efficiency, Cost 
Efficiency and Scale Efficiency  
An illustration of measuring efficiencies for the simple case of two inputs (X1, X2) 
and an output Y is shown in Figure 1. If a given firm uses a bundle of inputs, defined by point 
A, to produce a unit of output (as the frontier for technology k), the inefficiency of the firm 
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can be measured by the distance AB, which is the amount of all inputs that can be 
proportionally reduced without changing the level of output. Hence, the TE (the effectiveness 
with which a given set of outputs is produced by a set of inputs), AE (the efficiency with 
which inputs and outputs are allocated) and CE (the use of resources so as to minimize the 
costs of outputs) of firm A are computed by the ratios: 
TEk = OB/OA; AEk = OC/OB and CEk = OC/OA = TEk x AEk 
They are all bounded between zero and one. The distance CB represents the reduction in 
production costs that would occur if production were at the allocatively (and technically) 
efficient point D (D has TE = AE = CE = 1).  Firm B is technically efficient but allocatively 
inefficient. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of TE, AE and CE 
Figure 2. Illustration of SE in DEA (Coelli, 1996) 
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Coelli (1996) illustrated the calculation of scale economies in the DEA approach as 
shown in Figure 2. In this figure constant return to scale (CRS), variable return to scale 
(VRS) and non-increasing return to scale (NIRS) DEA frontier are drawn for one input and 
one output case (of technology k). Under CRS, firm B’s technical inefficiency is the distance 
BBC, while under VRS the technical inefficiency is only BBV. Hence, the TEs and SE (the 
potential productivity gain from achieving the optimal farm size) 2 are measured by the ratios: 
TECRSk = CBC/CB and TEVRSk = CBV/CB; SEk = CBC/CBV 
They are also bounded between zero and one. However, one drawback of this measure is that 
it does not tell if the firm is in increasing return to scale (IRS) or decreasing return to scale 
(DRS). To solve this problem, one can compare the NIRS TE score and the VRS TE score. If 
they are different, a firm exhibits IRS (like firm B) otherwise DRS (like firm A). 
Early applications of the DEA model applied only to technologies characterized by 
constant returns to scale (CRS). Banker et al. (1984) extended the analysis to accommodate 
technologies that exhibit variable returns to scale (VRS). Since there are three shrimp 
technologies, we need to estimate three group-frontiers. The CRS, input-oriented DEA allows 
one to estimate TE, AE and CE. The CRS DEA model of K inputs and M outputs of N DMUs 
is as follows: 
minλ,xi* wixi*, 
       subject to: 
  -yi + Yλ ≥ 0, 
 xi* – Xλ ≥ 0,                                        (1) 
            λ ≥ 0, 
where wi is a vector of input prices for the i-th firm; xi* is the cost-minimizing vector of input 
quantities for the i-th firm (calculated by linear programming), λ is an N x 1 vector of 
constants, X is a K x N input matrix, Y is an M x N output matrix, and yi is the output vector 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Coelli (1996) for further discussion. 
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of the i-th firm. In this chapter, the models comprise one output and multiple inputs that will 
be described in the data section.  
The DEAP program introduced by Coelli (1996) is one of software packages to 
estimate the DEA model. The nice features of DEAP are its availability and user-friendliness. 
It is designed to estimate DEA models exclusively and other softwares have not been proven 
to be superior to DEAP. Therefore, DEAP is employed to solve the problem (1) above N 
times, once for each DMU in the sample. It will then report a TE, AE, and CE score for each 
shrimp farmer classified into one of the three shrimp modes. 
 The VRS3, input-oriented DEA allows one to investigate SE. The VRS model is as 
follows: 
minλ,θ  θ, 
      subject to: 
 -yi + Yλ ≥ 0, 
 θxi – Xλ ≥ 0,                                      (2) 
       N1λ = 1, 
                      λ ≥ 0, 
	   
where xi, yi are the input vector and output vector of the i-th firm, respectively and N1 is an 
Nx1 vector of ones. The SE score will be reported by DEAP for each firm in the sample. The 
value of θ, where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, so obtained will be the efficiency score for i-th firm, with a value 
of 1 indicating a scale-efficient firm. 
2.3.2. Measuring technical efficiency across technologies  
 The technical frontier of each technology is estimated using (2). However, one cannot 
expect to compare efficiency across the three shrimp technologies by comparing the TE 
obtained from the group-frontiers because the technologies may have different benchmarks. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 An output-oriented DEA gives similar results. Given the possibility that shrimp farming causes pollution, the 
efficiency of input use is of more interest.  
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To make the measures comparable, the technical meta-frontier is estimated using the DEA 
approach (see O’Donnell et al., 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3 illustrates group-frontiers and the meta-frontier, which is the lowest envelope 
of the group-frontiers. Firm B is technically efficient under the group K frontier but 
technically inefficient under the meta-frontier. The inefficiency is measured by the distance 
CB. Hence the meta-technology ratio or technological efficiency of B is calculated as MTR = 
OC/OB. Similarly, MTR = TEk/MTE where, MTE is the TE of firm B with respect to the 
meta-frontier. MTR indicates that given the output level, the amount (equal to 1 − MTR) by 
which all inputs can be reduced by firm B from group K, which is feasible using the meta-
technology. D is technologically efficient (MTR = 1).  
2.3.3. Determining factors affecting efficiencies  
Apart from the technology used in shrimp farming, individual farm characteristics 
may also have an impact on productivity. For example, farmers attending training on farming 
techniques are expected to perform better than those who do not (provided that they are 
operating under otherwise similar conditions). Thus, following Timmer (1971) and Muller 
(1974), we aim to investigate the variation in TE across various socio-economic 
Figure 3. The group-frontier and meta-frontier 
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characteristics. Because the dependent variable, the TE score for each farm, is censored 
between zero and one, we employ the Tobit model to yield unbiased estimates of the 
characteristic effects: 
                       !"! = !! + !!!! + !!!!!!                                                                    (3) 
where TEi is the TE score for farm i obtained from above, β0 is a constant, βj is parameter j 
associated with socio-economic variables j, xj, εi is an error term. The key M explanatory 
variables relating to TE used in this model are the education level of the household head 
(years of schooling), family size (persons), the ratio of females over 16 to males over 16, 
shrimp farming experience (years) which measures how long the farmers have been 
practicing shrimp farming on their current farming areas, training on shrimp farming (training 
times). We also include 1 province dummy (B-L dummy), 1 location dummy (upstream 
dummy) and 2 technology dummies (intensive and semi-intensive dummy) for comparison 
purposes. If untreated waste (polluted) water resulting from upstream shrimp farms imposes 
negative impacts on downstream farmers’ production, downstream farmers will need to use 
more chemicals to treat the water used by their farm. In this case, downstream farmers will 
incur higher production costs, which will be reflected in lower efficiency scores.   
2.4. Data 
A total of 292 shrimp farmers practicing intensive, semi-intensive, and extensive 
farming in 8 communes (detailed below) of the Bac Lieu (B-L) and Tra Vinh (TV) provinces, 
the two main contributors to the MRD’s shrimp farmed production, were randomly surveyed 
in early 2009 by students and researchers of the School of Economics and Business 
Administration, Can Tho University, Vietnam. Recommendations from Departments of 
Fisheries of the two provinces on survey locations were collected and followed before the 
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survey was carried out. Within the designated areas, farmers were then chosen randomly for 
interview. Household heads, the main decision maker, were asked to answer a questionnaire 
(see the appendix). The questionnaire was designed to elicit the demographical, socio-
economic factors and production mode of shrimp farmers as well as their entire specific 
production costs (from pond preparation to harvest) and revenues of the last shrimp crop. It 
also explored marketing activity as well as advantages and disadvantages of selling activity 
and credit accessibility of shrimp farmers. Table 3 summarizes some characteristics of shrimp 
farmers in the sample. In general mean (average) values are very similar to median values 
across the variables, hence only average numbers are discussed. The average age of the 
household head is quite similar across the two provinces, around 45 years. 
On average, household heads in TV attain slightly higher education than those in B-L 
while household size in B-L is slightly larger than in TV. On average, total pond area is the 
biggest for extensive farms in both provinces. The smallest total pond area is among semi-
intensive farms in TV and intensive farms in B-L. In general, there is no difference in 
intensive total pond area between the two provinces, but semi-intensive and extensive total 
pond areas in TV are bigger than those in B-L (Table 2). The data show that an average 
farmer in TV is slightly more experienced than farmer in B-L (Table 2). A similar result is 
reported for training that focuses on technical aspects of shrimp farming practices. Training 
on wastewater treatments has been still very limited (Pham et al. 2010). Farmers in TV attend 
slightly more training sessions than farmers in B-L, on average, and the proportion of farmers 
attending training is higher in TV as well (Table 3). 
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Table 3. Summary statistics on shrimp farming data 
Variable B-L TV 
Intensive Semi-
intensive 
Extensive Intensive Semi-
intensive 
Extensive 
N = 39 N = 23 N = 81 N = 56 N = 46 N = 47 
Age of HH 
head 
(years) 
Median 
Average 
49 
48.67 
41 
43.65 
46 
44.95 
45 
44.46 
44.50 
44.83 
46 
46.47 
SD 11.02 7.96 10.58 8.25 8.00 11.00 
Min 32 33 18 26      26 28 
Max 73 57 74 68 72 77 
Education 
of HH head 
(years) 
Median 
Average 
6 
6.56 
8 
8.09 
7 
6.75 
9 
8.44 
9 
8.65 
7 
7.68 
SD 3.13 2.92 2.84 2.85 3.00 3.00 
Min 2 0 0 2 2 1 
Max 13 12 13 12 12 12 
HH size 
(persons) 
Median 
Average 
5 
4.77 
5 
5.57 
4 
4.91 
4 
4.66 
4.50 
4.98 
5 
4.74 
SD 1.51 2.76 1.99 1.44 2.00 0.00 
Min 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Max 10 15 12 8 10 10 
Males Median 
Average 
2 
2.31 
2 
2.65 
2 
2.43 
2 
2.30 
2 
2.35 
2 
2.32 
SD 0.95 1.50 1.49 1.11 1.00 1.00 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max 4 7 11 6 5 4 
Females Median 
Average 
2 
2.44 
2 
2.83 
2 
2.52 
2 
2.32 
2 
2.63 
2 
2.43 
SD 1.35 2.06 1.25 1.06 1.00 1.00 
Min 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Max 6 10 7 6 7 9 
Males over 
16 
Median 
Average 
2 
1.90 
2 
2.39 
2 
2.17 
2 
1.98 
2 
1.93 
2 
1.89 
SD 0.99 1.56 1.56 1.07 1.00 1.00 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max 4 7 11 6 5 4 
Females 
over 16 
Median 
Average 
1 
1.69 
2 
1.96 
2 
1.89 
1 
1.77 
2 
1.96 
2 
1.98 
SD 1.06 1.36 1.08 1.11 1.00 1.00 
Min 1 0 0 1 1 1 
Max 6 6 6 6 5 7 
Total pond 
areas (ha) 
Median 
Average 
1.3 
1.3 
1 
1.79 
1.4 
2.16 
1 
1.73 
0.7 
0.87 
2 
2.94 
SD 0.54 1.95 2.71 2.37 0.49 2.72 
Min 0.10 0.80 0.60 0.25 0.22 0.36 
Max 2.00 10.00 23.00 15.00 2.50 10.00 
Farmer's 
experience 
(years) 
Median 
Average 
7 
7.72 
7 
7.83 
8 
7.91 
6 
7.81 
7 
9.02 
9 
8.94 
SD 3.28 3.88 3.35 5.13 6.00 4.00 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 3 
Max 17 21 19 19 22 19 
Training :  no 
                  yes              
 13 (33%) 11 (48%) 52 (64%) 9 (16%) 14 (30%) 6 (13%) 
 26 (67%) 12 (52%) 29 (36%) 47 (84%) 32 (70%) 41 (87%) 
Median 
Average 
2 
1.69 
1 
1.67 
1 
1.90 
2 
2.70 
2 
1.97 
2 
2.85 
SD 0.79 0.89 1.21 3.31 1.00 3.00 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max 4 3 6 20 4 15 
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Similar to Sousa-Junior et al. (2004), Huy et al. (2009) and Pham (2010), the data for 
the DEA analysis comprise output yield (kg/ha), input use—seed (1,000ind/ha), feed (kg/ha), 
labour (hours/ha), fertilizer/chemical input (e.g. calcium carbonate, urea, diammonium 
phosphate) (kg/ha) and fuel (l/ha)—and the corresponding prices. Farmers practicing 
intensive and semi-intensive shrimp farming all recorded inputs used so that they keep track 
of their production cost. Similarly, many extensive farmers (80% in the sample) keep track of 
their production costs. Shrimp farms have one production cycle per year, which lasts for 4-6 
months (Pham et al. 2010). 
On average, the output and input use per hectare for intensive farms are higher than 
those of semi-intensive and extensive farms, as shown in Table 4. The average intensive 
farm’s yield is 2513kg/ha, almost double that of semi-intensive farms, and more than 15 
times the yield of an average extensive farm. There are on average 35.7 post-larvae (i.e., 
individual baby shrimp) per cubic meter for intensive farms, compared with 26.6 for semi-
intensive farms and 5.8 for extensive farms. Feed use is an average of 4084kg/ha for 
intensive farms, almost doubles that of semi-intensive farms and almost 70 times higher than 
that of extensive farms. It is a similar story for fertilizer, labour, and fuel. Table 3 also shows 
there is a big variation within each input used and output in each type of shrimp practice and 
across the three practices, which also typically represents the differences of the technologies. 
Given that shrimp farmers in both provinces are practicing the same three 
technologies, other things equal, one might expect that pollution would impose a negative 
impact on downstream farms more compared to upstream farms. Like agricultural practices, 
water quality, among other factors (e.g. weather, soil), is essential to shrimp farming. Farmers 
need to treat or clean water appropriately before releasing baby shrimp (post larvae) into their 
grow-out ponds. After harvest, the water from shrimp ponds, polluted with unconsumed feed, 
chemical, and possibly even diseases, is dumped directly into rivers. Downstream farms that 
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pump water needed for grow-out ponds from polluted rivers are therefore exposed to negative 
impacts relatively more compared to upstream farms.  To measure the extent of pollution on 
downstream shrimp farms we analyze maps of river flow and, for each province, are able to 
classify farms as either “upstream” or “downstream” relative to the flow of the river. 
Table 4. Summary of output yield and input use (per hectare per crop) 
Output or Input Intensive (N=95) Semi-Intensive (N=69) Extensive (N=128) 
Yield          Average 
(kg)            SD 
                   Min 
                   Max 
2,513 
1,577 
200 
8,000 
1,350 
654 
210 
2,625 
146 
117 
13 
500 
Seed          Average 
(1000ind)  SD 
                   Min 
                   Max 
357 
129 
77 
770 
266 
122 
48 
533 
58 
49 
1 
218 
Labor         Average 
(hours)      SD 
                   Min 
                   Max 
769 
373 
207 
3,125 
722 
479 
124 
2,500 
141 
121 
14 
615 
Feed          Average 
(kg)            SD 
                   Min 
                   Max 
4,084 
3,255 
594 
15,551 
2,212 
1,235 
620 
6,483 
63 
93 
1 
509 
Fertilizer   Average 
(kg)            SD 
                   Min 
                   Max 
923 
401 
102 
2,120 
645 
591 
104 
2,876 
29 
70 
0 
504 
Fuel           Average 
(l)               SD 
                   Min 
                   Max 
637 
443 
77 
2,138 
531 
412 
112 
2,292 
102 
137 
9 
1,213 
 
As mentioned earlier, shrimp farming areas are isolated from other sources of 
pollution. Following the river flow, we expect that pollution from upstream farms imposes 
negative effects on downstream farms. TV is located between the Hau and Tien rivers (the 
two big branches of the Mekong River). Shrimp farmers in the TV sample are located in 4 
districts—Chau Thanh, Cau Ngang, Tra Cu and Duyen Hai. Duyen Hai is located in the 
southern-most part of TV while the other three districts lie to the north. Thus, consistent with 
the river flows, farmers located in Duyen Hai are defined to be “downstream” while farms 
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located in the remaining districts are defined to be “upstream”. In the early 1990s, a “fresh 
waterization” project for the Ca Mau peninsular (to channel water from Mekong River to the 
peninsular for agricultural and aquaculture practices) —comprising Can Tho city, Hau Giang, 
Soc Trang, Bac Lieu, Ca Mau and part of Kien Giang province—was carried out. The project 
aimed at promoting shrimp farming in the region by creating a system of channels and dams, 
which bring fresh water from the Hau river and prevent seawater intrusion. Following the 
flow of the river, farms located in Bac Lieu town and Hoa Binh (Vinh Loi district) are 
defined to be “upstream” and farms located in Long Dien and Ganh Hao (both in the Gia Rai 
district) are “downstream”. 4 Maps of the provinces are in the appendix.  
2.5. Results 
As mentioned above, DEAP will run equations (1) and (2) 292 times, one for each 
farmer in the sample of 292, to obtain TE, AE, SE and CE score for each of the farmers 
classified into one of the three practices. Generally speaking, the TE, AE, SE and CE for each 
shrimp technology are quite low, as shown in Table 4. The results indicate that farmers are, 
on average, operating at technically and economically inefficient levels, suggesting that there 
is room for improvement by re-allocating or reducing input levels. Thus, proper usage of 
inputs would have a positive impact on efficiency. Specifically, the TE scores are 70%, 53%, 
and 31%, respectively, for the semi-intensive, intensive and extensive farms. Thus, on 
average, semi-intensive, intensive, and extensive farmers can improve their productivity by 
reducing input use by 30%, 47% and 69% without reducing the output, respectively. The 
results are in line with study by Ancev et al. (2010) and Pham (2010). Together with Reddy 
et al. (2008) the results show that shrimp farmers in India have higher TE scores, on average, 
than shrimp farmers in Vietnam. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The upstream and downstream definition is also consistent with advice of experts at the department of fisheries 
in the two provinces. 
 
 
25 
Similarly, on average, the scale efficiency measures for intensive, semi-intensive and 
extensive farms are 67%, 80% and 53%, respectively (Table 5, third row). Table 5 also shows 
that 12% of the intensive farmers, 20% of the semi-intensive farmers, and 8% of the 
extensive farmers are operating at the optimal scale (CRS). Further, 85% of the intensive, 
58% of the semi-intensive and 88% of the extensive farmers exhibit increasing returns to 
scale (IRS). This means that these farms are operating at below the optimal scale; they can 
decrease costs by increasing production. On the other hand, the farms that exhibit decreasing 
returns to scale (DRS) — 3% of the intensive farmers, 22% of semi-intensive farmers, and 
4% of extensive farmers — can increase their technical efficiency by reducing production.   
Table 5. Efficiencies with respect to group-frontiers 
 Intensive (N=95) Semi-Intensive (N=69) Extensive (N=128) 
TE          Average 
               S.D 
               Min* 
 
0.530 
0.269 
0.075 
 
0.700 
0.242 
0.103 
 
0.313 
0.278 
0.014 
 
SE          Average 
               S.D 
               Min* 
 
0.674 
0.272 
0.095 
 
0.799 
0.220 
0.166 
 
0.528 
0.293 
0.047 
 
AE          Average 
               S.D 
               Min* 
 
0.476 
0.205 
0.066 
 
0.695 
0.182 
0.318 
 
0.362 
0.226 
0.037 
 
CE          Average 
               S.D 
               Min* 
 
0.235 
0.167 
0.007 
 
0.384 
0.161 
0.064 
 
0.089 
0.119 
0.005 
 
No. of       IRS 
farms        DRS 
                  CRS 
81 (85%) 
3   (3%) 
11 (12%) 
40 (58%) 
15 (22%) 
14 (20%) 
113 (88%) 
5   (4%) 
10   (8%) 
* Maximum is one for all measures and technologies. 
The CE scores in Table 5 indicate that the intensive, semi-intensive and extensive 
shrimp farms in the sample need to reduce their production costs by 76%, 62% and 91%, 
respectively, to reach maximum profit. Following this, the AE scores suggest that they need 
to reduce their inefficiencies in a combination of the inputs used by 52%, 30% and 64% 
respectively, given the respective relationships among the prices of the inputs. This is a 
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notable result since compared to their peers, farmers are using a great deal of inputs to 
produce the same level of output, pushing up their production costs. In context of shrimp 
farming pollution, their production costs become even higher, contributing to the low cost 
efficiency. 
Overall, the results suggest that for a given level of output, farmers are using more 
than the optimal level of inputs. Since pollution may impose higher production costs by 
decreasing water quality, especially for downstream farms, the results so far are at least 
suggestive that pollution may play a role in the inefficiency of shrimp farming.  
Table 6. Tobit regression results 
TE  is dep. Variable Intensive, N=95 
Semi-intensive, 
N=69 
Extensive, 
N=128 
MTE is dep. 
var. (N =292) 
 
Age 45 dummy 
 
.0203 
(.0135) 
.1207 
(.1005) 
.0268 
(.0142) 
.0546* 
(.0274) 
Education .0025 (.0680) 
-.0174 
(.0348) 
.0067 
(.0134) 
-.0028 
(.0051) 
LnHHSize .1676* (.0851) 
.0916 
(.0832) 
-.0358 
(.1790) 
.0727 
(.0449) 
Female16/Male16 .0681 (.0790) 
-.00002 
(.0010) 
-.0154 
(.1540) 
.0014 
(.0208) 
Total pond area .0139 (.0158) 
.0268 
(.0223) 
.0068 
(.0170) 
.0136* 
(.0069) 
Experience -.0116** (.0051) 
-.0010 
(.0013) 
.0140** 
(.0060) 
.0068** 
(.0029) 
Training Time -.0015 (.0112) 
.0577* 
(.0288) 
-.0120 
(.0109) 
-.0028 
(.0071) 
B-L dummy .2357*** (.0599) 
.0925 
(.0544) 
.0222 
(.0138) 
.1492*** 
(.0317) 
Upstream dummy .2030*** (.0507) 
.0445 
(.0318) 
.116** 
(.0515) 
.1388*** 
(.0303) 
Intensive dummy    
-.0514 
(.0501) 
Semi-intensive dummy    
-.1540*** 
(.0397) 
Constant .1019 (.0599) 
.5777** 
(.2409) 
.1628 
(.0904) 
.1091 
(.0641) 
     Pseudo R2 .5605 .2032 .1707 .6105 
         * Significant at the 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level; standard errors in parentheses  
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As discussed earlier, Tobit model was employed to estimate impacts of socio-
economic factors on TE. Table 6 shows results from the Tobit regressions relating the TE of 
each type of shrimp farming to various socio-economic factors. The natural logarithm of 
household size is positively and significantly related to the TE for intensive shrimp farmers, 
meaning that shrimp farmers with more family members have a higher TE score than farmers 
with fewer family members. However, the effect on the TE for semi-intensive and extensive 
farmers is not statistically significant. A possible explanation is that intensive shrimp farming 
is more sensitive to water and soil quality, hence having more people taking care of the 
production is better. 5 Indeed, it is likely that for intensive farming, more family members are 
able to monitor their farms better, which perhaps allows the farmers to act more promptly to 
any changes to farming environment (e.g. pH, oxygen levels of the growout ponds) and thus 
improves the production better.  
Experience – years of shrimp farming on the current cultivated areas – is found to 
have a negative and significant relationship with the TE for intensive farmers, a negative and 
insignificant relationship for semi-intensive farmers, and a positive and significant one for 
extensive farmers. The estimates indicate that the more years a farmer practices intensive 
shrimp farming, the lower productivity of shrimp farm; the opposite is true for extensive 
farmers. This surprising result is actually in line with other studies on the environmental 
impact of shrimp farms (e.g. Golez, 1995; Khang, 2008; Hung et al., 2005; Tho et al., 2008 
and Joyce et al., 2006). In fact, the longer shrimp are intensively cultivated, the more the soil 
is degraded,6 which in turn imposes a negative impact on the shrimp farm itself as well as on 
other agricultural activities such as rice farming (Tho et al., 2008; Sammut, 1999 & Boyd, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Golze (1995) found that shrimp farming deteriorates soils due to presence of acid sulfate. Acid sulfate soils 
reduce water quality in shrimp ponds, and ground water. Consequently, this has negative effects on shrimp 
production. 
6 The soil deteriorates due to water pollution from shrimp farming in the sense that there is an excessive level of 
salt and sodium.  
 
 
28 
1992).  Extensive shrimp farms cultivated by more experienced farmers tend to be more 
efficient. This is also consistent with other studies (Ancev et al., 2010 & Kumar et al., 2004). 
This finding is also consistent with experience being negatively related to TE. Given 
intensive shrimp farm is the most polluting, it is likely that the soil at intensive shrimp farms 
deteriorates the most.  
The amount of training is positively and significantly related to the TE of semi-
intensive farmers, with the interpretation that more training helps semi-intensive farmers 
increase their productivity. However, training has a negative but insignificant effect for 
intensive and extensive farms, which may be due to the inappropriate training, consistent 
with Reddy et al. (2008).  
The TE for farmers in B-L province is positively and significantly higher for intensive 
shrimp farms, meaning that intensive farmers in B-L are more technically efficient than 
farmers in TV province.  This might be explained by other factors which are not captured in 
the Tobit model such as weather, land quality, or water quality.  
Given that shrimp farmers in both provinces are practicing the same three 
technologies, other things equal, one might expect that further downstream farms would 
expose to more pollution compared to upstream farms. Thus one would expect downstream 
farms to be less technically efficient than upstream ones. Table 6 shows the upstream dummy 
variable is positively and significantly related to the TE of intensive and extensive farms but 
insignificant for semi-intensive farms. The estimates show that upstream intensive and 
extensive farms are more technically efficient than downstream intensive and extensive 
farms, respectively. Indeed, in each of the two provinces and while controlling for a number 
of socio-economic factors, the general picture is that further upstream farms are less affected 
by pollution and thus more technically efficient than further downstream farms. 
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   Table 7. Meta-frontier estimates of technical efficiency 
Factor Intensive Semi-intensive Extensive 
Meta-frontier TE                  Average 
(MTE)                                     SD  
                                                Min 
                                                Max 
0.324 
0.212 
0.047 
1.000 
0.222 
0.138 
0.016 
0.695 
0.429 
0.330 
0.016 
1.000 
Technological efficiency      Average 
(MTR) = TECRS/MTE             SD                                                                                                  
                                                Min                                                 
                                                Max 
0.602 
0.156
0.276 
1.000 
0.304 
0.114
0.130 
0.695 
0.833 
0.247
0.066 
1.000 
TEs with respect to group-frontiers are not comparable, as discussed earlier. 
Therefore, we estimate the meta-frontier and results are reported in Table 7. Extensive 
farmers on average are more technically efficient than intensive and semi-intensive farmers 
with a TE of 0.429, 0.324, and 0.222, respectively. The results are robust, as the Tobit 
regression (Table 6, last column) reports that extensive farms have significantly higher MTE 
than that those of semi-intensive and of intensive farms. The MTE measures suggest that, on 
average, shrimp farmers in the two provinces are inefficient. Similarly, extensive farms are 
also more technologically efficient than intensive and semi-intensive ones. The MTR 
estimates (as shown in Table 7) of 0.602, 0.304 and 0.833 indicate that, given the output 
level, on average, 39.8%, 69.4% and 16.7% of all inputs can be reduced by an intensive, 
semi-intensive or extensive farmer, respectively. Intensive and semi-intensive farms produce 
more yield than extensive farms but also use many more inputs. This may explain the reason 
intensive and semi-intensive farms are found to be less efficient. The result will challenge 
shrimp farmers and policy planners in Vietnam to promote more efficient technologies since 
it is likely that intensive and semi-intensive shrimp farms are more polluting but less efficient 
than extensive farms.  
The TEs are comparable under the meta-frontier approach. The results of Tobit 
regression to find factors related to the MTEs are reported on the last column of Table 6. We 
find that farmers aged over 45 are slightly more efficient than younger farmers, which is 
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consistent with older farmers having a better knowledge of shrimp farming. A similar result 
is found by Reddy et al. (2008). Farm size and experience are found to be positively related 
to MTE; indicating that an increase in farm size and experience7 can improve the MTE. 
Similar correlations were also found by Ancev et al. (2010) and Reddy et al. (2008). The 
upstream dummy is positively and significantly related to the MTE, meaning that upstream 
farms are more technically efficient than downstream farms. This result confirms the earlier 
results for each type of shrimp practice. Hence, the difference in the MTEs between upstream 
shrimp farms and downstream shrimp farms suggests that pollution may be a factor in the 
shrimp industry. A similar result is found for the provincial effect, the B-L dummy variable is 
positively related to MTE, suggesting that farmers in B-L are more technically efficient than 
farmers in TV. Again, other factors might explain this difference. 
2.6. Conclusion  
The estimated technical efficiency of shrimp farms with respect to the group-frontier 
in the two provinces are, on average, 53%, 70% and 43% for intensive, semi-intensive and 
extensive farms, respectively. With respect to the meta-frontier, extensive farming is found to 
be the most efficient with a TE of 43%, followed by intensive farming at 32% and semi-
intensive farming at 22%. In general, the three practices perform far below the optimal levels. 
Intensive farming, which is usually thought of as the most profitable, is found to be less 
efficient than extensive farming. This may reflect the pollution problem that is a by-product 
of shrimp production. The results also show that given the level of outputs, inefficient 
farmers use much more inputs and hence incur higher costs than efficient farmers. Therefore, 
reducing inputs used to their optimal level would increase productivity for shrimp farmers as 
well as cause less impact on the environment, and especially on the quality of water and soil.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It is not contradict to the findings above since with meta-frontier we need to treat all samples as a whole: 
experience may have stronger positive relationship with the MTE of extensive farm and it makes no sense to 
find the relationship between the experience and the MTE for each shrimp practice.	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Treating shrimp practices separately (TE estimated with respect to a group-frontier), it 
is found that experience is negatively related to the TE of intensive farms and positively 
related to the TE of extensive farms. With respect to the meta-frontier results, age of 
household head, farm size, and experience are found to be positively related to the TEs of the 
farms. Importantly, the TE with respect to either the group-frontier or the meta-frontier is 
found to be positively related to the upstream dummy; everything else equal, the productivity 
of downstream farms is lower than upstream farms. This result indicates that pollution may 
play a role in explaining efficiency differences between downstream farms and upstream 
farms. Other factors such as weather, soil and water quality may explain the differences in TE 
of shrimp farms in the two provinces.  
In summary, shrimp farmers are not efficient. In other words, they use more inputs 
than necessary to produce to a given level of output. Inefficient farmers could improve their 
productivity compared to their peers by reducing the amount of inputs used. This may reflect 
the dynamics of shrimp farming and pollution. Shrimp farmers dump untreated wastewater 
into the river system that negatively affects shrimp production. Indeed, too much pollution 
not only means farmers use more chemicals inputs to control for water quality but also it 
increases the likelihood of shrimp catching diseases and becoming contaminated with 
chemicals (e.g. antibiotics), leading to higher production costs and greater risk of failure. This 
is consistent with Vo (2003), who argues that shrimp farming plays a key role in food safety 
chain of exported shrimp products. Pollution may also explain why an average extensive 
farmer was found to be more efficient than an average intensive farmer. Lastly, and most 
notably, compared to upstream farms downstream farms are more affected adversely by 
wastewater pollution. Even controlling for key socio-economic factors, provincial difference, 
downstream farms have lower TE scores than that of upstream farms, suggesting wastewater 
pollution may play a role. However, the data with additional detailed weather, soil and water 
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quality of shrimp farms would give more concrete picture on dynamics of shrimp farming 
and wastewater pollution. This is an interesting area left for future research.    
The empirical findings in this chapter indicate that shrimp farmers and policy-makers 
in the MRD should take the shrimp farming pollution issue seriously. The pollution caused 
by a shrimp farm not only imposes negative impacts on others but also over time on the 
shrimp farm itself.  As pointed out by Tho et al. (2008), farmers that experience shrimp 
farming failure often also experience rice farm failure within the same cultivated area due to 
salinity and sodicity resulting from shrimp farming. The pollution can only be avoided by 
each farmer investing in wastewater treatment. There is a successful model currently 
practiced in coastal areas (where there is a big proportion of mangrove) of the Ca Mau 
province (Le, 2007).  Farmers there are practicing organic shrimp farming which is 
monitored and certified by Naturland8. The practice is economically and environmentally 
grounded and hence a better practice.  For inland shrimp farming, there are now available 
technologies for wastewater treatment with reasonable costs (Pham et al. 2010). Since 
wastewater treatment is costly, farmers have little incentive to invest. The next chapter will 
focus on the possibility of an agency similar to Naturland as an incentive to study the 
cooperative behaviour of shrimp farmers. 	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 It is an association for organic agriculture: www.naturland.de.  
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CHAPTER 3: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON THE 
POSSIBILITY OF USING AN AGENCY AS A 
SOLUTION TO THE POLLUTION PROBLEM 
FACING SHRIMP FARMERS 
3.1. Introduction 
Recognizing the important role of the Vietnamese shrimp industry shown earlier in 
Chapter 2, the government at a national and local level has imposed a number of policies to 
promote and regulate shrimp farming, especially in the MRD. Firstly, the government 
subsidizes low interest rate loans made available to shrimp farmers. Regulation is introduced 
by the Ministry of Fisheries (MoFi) under Vietnam decree 04/2002/QD-BTS. According to 
the decree, all shrimp farming must be isolated from other sources of pollution such as 
industrial, agricultural, and household waste. Other policies attempt to target particular areas, 
for instance, the Ca Mau peninsula fresh waterization project was carried out in the early 
1990s. It involves using Naturland, a German certification agency for organically farmed 
products, to monitor pollution levels and farming practices.  Le (2007) reports initial and 
encouraging results of organic shrimp farming in Tam Giang commune, Nam Can district, 
the Ca Mau province where a total of 1,197 shrimp farmers represented by a forest company 
(i.e. Forestry company No.184) are combining shrimp farming with forest replanting in order 
to restore and develop mangrove area. The farmers need to follow strict and stringent 
standards set by Naturland for the mangrove-shrimp model. Indeed, the certified organic 
shrimp products are sold at higher price at both domestic and foreign markets (e.g. COOP 
supermarket chain in Switzerland). This model is economically and environmentally 
grounded and hence a better practice. 
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However, at a general level and in a sharp contrast to its economic advantages, the 
results from the previous chapter suggest that shrimp farming is not in a good and sustainable 
position economically and environmentally. That is, there are ways for farmers to improve 
their farming productivity and, in particular, farmers are overusing inputs to produce a level 
of output generating too much pollution that adversely affects shrimp production. Although 
technical solutions for mitigating and preventing water pollution resulting from shrimp 
aquaculture especially from nutrient loading, chemical and drug contamination, have been 
studied extensively (Tuan et al., 2005; Trai et al., 2006; Long & Toan, 2008; Bosma et al., 
2009), the Vietnamese government has apparently struggled to regulate compliance with 
legislated and recommended water-quality measures of aquaculture practices (Pham et al., 
2011). This thus raises the need for more feasible and implementable alternatives. Given that 
Vietnam is a developing country having weak law enforcements and institutional regulations, 
this chapter focuses on testing the effectiveness of both an incentive scheme that theoretically 
motivates farmers to reduce wastewater pollution and the effectiveness of making all farmers 
aware of the pollution problem and how to avoid it; then to let the farmers self-manage the 
wastewater pollution.  
Wastewater typically contains excessive levels of unconsumed feed, chemicals or 
even diseases. There have been several instances in which shrimp exporting products were 
contaminated to the extent they did not meet the standards of European, Japanese or U.S. 
markets and were sent back to Vietnam. The shrimp industry as a whole was heavily affected. 
Vo (2003) studies the safety management of the shrimp food chain in the MRD. She found 
that the shrimp farming practices play a key role in ensuring the safety of shrimp products.  
Thus, solving the pollution problem is not only in line with safe shrimp production, because 
less polluted water results in less disease and hence less chemicals used, but also is good for 
the environment and the sustainability of the shrimp industry in the long run.  
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As the sources of pollution can be identified only at a very high cost, the kind of 
wastewater pollution involved in shrimp production can be seen as ‘non-point source 
pollution’, that is water pollution is easier and more feasible to be measured at aggregate 
level than individual level. Wastewater dumped by a shrimp farmer to a canal affects 
neighbouring farmers’ production. Additionally, wastewater coming from upstream pollutes 
not only the surrounding canals but also downstream areas of the river system. Therefore 
farmers located downstream will be affected by both the pollution generated in their area and 
the pollution generated upstream. As found in chapter 2, on average, shrimp farmers are not 
technically and economically efficient and downstream farms have a lower TE score than 
upstream farms. That is, the efficiency of downstream farms is more influenced by 
wastewater pollution compared to that of upstream farms.   
The wastewater problem of shrimp farming can, hence, be modelled as a step-level 
public good game for which the public good is provided if the total contribution reaches a 
threshold since solving the wastewater problem requires that each farmer treat wastewater 
appropriately before dumping it into rivers (Pham et al., 2010). If the water in the rivers is 
cleaned, all farmers enjoy benefits from it. However, since adopting a wastewater treatment is 
costly there is little incentive for a farmer to invest in wastewater treatment while others do 
not. Solutions to environmental problems through collective action have been studied 
extensively.  In some instances when institutions are weak (e.g., in developing countries), 
informal instruments (e.g., a community-based approach) seem to work better than formal 
instruments (e.g., government regulations) (see Ostrom, 1990; Russell and Vaughan, 2003).   
Formal and informal instruments to tackle non-point source pollution were 
experimentally studied by Cason and Gangadharan (2012). They found that while tax 
regulation has a positive impact on pollution reduction, peer punishment has little effect. 
However, also in line with findings by Russell and Vaughan (2003), it is also possible that 
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formal regulation imposed by governments, such as environmental tax, may not work in 
developing countries, especially in Vietnam where law enforcement and government 
regulations are weak. More precisely, tax on individual farmers would be hard to impose 
because the pollution at individual level is hard and costly to be measured as well as there is 
constraint on manpower to enforce and monitor the tax program. Moreover, previous research 
has found that formal institution (e.g. taxation) may fail because of crowding out of intrinsic 
motivation (Reeson, 2008). Therefore, this chapter aims at testing the possibility of more 
feasible policy solutions to the problem facing farmers.  The particular incentive structure 
suggested here is a monitoring and certification agency (MCA) like Naturland mentioned 
earlier, which is already present in the field, hence improving external validity of our 
research. The MCA is similar to a targeting mechanism used in non-source pollution 
literature. That is the mechanism allows the regulator to impose a group tax on all the sources 
that responsible for pollution in a particular region, the MCA imposes a certificate of 
pollution for all group members depending on the total pollution observed in the region. The 
key distinguishing feature of the two is that the regulator and the MCA would affect payoffs 
of polluters directly and indirectly, respectively. More precisely, we test the possibility of 
using the MCA as a solution to a public bad (the pollution). Specifically, we want to see if 
shrimp farmers are more cooperative in solving the pollution problem in the presence of the 
MCA. Furthermore, we also explore the possibility of self-governance of shrimp farmers 
because it may be of importance for informal regulations (e.g. cooperatives and community-
based solutions). 
Previous research on the effectiveness of certification agency has found that 
certification can improve market outcomes. For example, Cason and Ganadharan (2002) 
studied experimentally the effectiveness of policy instruments that include seller reputations, 
unverified cheaptalk and a certification agency in posted offer markets with differing quality 
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products. They found that the only reliable way to improve product quality is to use a 
certification agency.  Similarly, Burfurd et al. (2012) studied the efficacy of policy 
alternatives targeted to improve energy efficiency in residential rental markets. They found 
that enabling landlords to post the energy efficiency of their properties increases investment 
in energy efficiency. While these papers study the efficacy of certification applied to the 
context of markets, the MCA used in our experiment is applied to the step-level public goods 
game. Moreover, the MCA works base on group’s performance while certification agencies 
of the papers functions base on individual performance. Hence, our work expands the 
literature.   
Cooperation of stakeholders plays an important role in protecting and preventing 
common resources from depletion as well as in providing public goods, especially in contexts 
where government plays a little role. Economist, among others, has thus tried to study and 
promote cooperation using a combination of incentives and behavioural insights. For 
instance, Cardenas et al. (2008) propose an irrigation game which models a water provision 
problem, in which participants decide how much water to extract. The game was played in 
the field to study the behaviour of stakeholders and to study the efficacy of the three proposed 
rules, namely lottery, rotation and property rights. Each player has a different location along 
the river. The results show that people were not cooperative and the rules did not have 
positive impacts. Werthmann et al. (2010) also studied the cooperative behaviour of people in 
Cambodia and Vietnam. Participants played standard public goods and common pool 
resource games with context-specific examples (e.g., building a dyke or fishing) and no 
anonymity condition (i.e., participants knew identities of their group members). The approach 
was taken to take into account that in a community people usually know each other and all 
face the same issues such as building a dyke and fishing. In contrast with Cardenas et al. 
(2008), people in both countries played close to the socially optimal equilibrium and the 
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observed behaviour was quite stable over time. Notably, Ostrom et al. (1992) argue that in 
many cases appropriators of common resources can achieve credible self-governance without 
relying on external authorities. They show that collective action that is a solution to the 
tragedy of the commons can be taken by allowing subjects to interact through communication 
and/or punishment. A study by Guillen et al. (2006) supports this result. The authors designed 
an experiment where subjects play the step-level public goods game with and without a 
centralized sanctioning mechanism (CSM). Subjects’ cooperation level in the first 7 rounds 
was found to be much higher in the treatments with the CSM compared to the baseline 
treatment (without the CSM), further than that it was also found that the pattern remained 
unchanged in the last 7 rounds where the CSM was automatically removed or removed by 
group voting.   
Venkatachalam (2008) and Brown & Hagen (2010) point out the importance of 
behavioural anomalies to optimal environmental policies. That is, policy makers need to take 
into account “all behavioural aspects” for designing and implementing a sound policy since 
people may behave differently compared to what conventional theories predict and they often 
yield undesired outcomes. Thus, before implementing a new policy instrument, testing how 
people respond to it is important. Laboratory experimentation is a useful tool to achieve that 
because it not only allows more control but also it allows testing the efficacy of policy 
instrument at minimal costs and without distorting the behaviour of people in the field (see 
Reeson, 2008).  
Based on the review above, we use a step-level public goods game to model the 
problem facing shrimp farmers. Vossler et al. (2006), Suter et al. (2008), and Camacho-
Cuena and Requate (2012) employ context-framed laboratory experiments similar to ours. 
That is, subjects (mostly university students) play a role of polluting firms making decision 
on inputs used within several policy scenarios. The approach is to mimic the real problems in 
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the field and hence to study the efficacy of interested policy instruments. In our experiment, 
each subject acts as a shrimp farmer facing the pollution problem. Farmers are located either 
upstream or downstream of a river so upstream farmers face the adverse effect of their own 
pollution, but downstream farmers might be affected by both their own and pollution from 
upstream farmers.  The pollution problem is solved when upstream and downstream groups 
each invest enough in wastewater treatment. We set up 2 different treatments (described in 
the next section): a baseline treatment without a monitoring and certification agency (MCA) 
and a treatment with the MCA.  Follow Guillen et al. (2006), we have 2 phases in each 
treatment. This is to study the possibility of self-governance of laboratory shrimp farmers. 
More precisely, after any policy intervention period (i.e. Phase 2), it is interesting to see 
whether or not the farmers can sustain what had been achieved during the intervention period 
(i.e. Phase 1). Thus, to see the possibility of self-governance of the shrimp farmers, 
cooperation levels of Phase 1 and Phase 2 for each treatment will be compared. Even our 
experimental design is targeted the wastewater problem facing shrimp farmers, it is also very 
well suited for a variety of upstream-downstream problems (e.g. water use, 
industrial/municipal water source pollution, salinity zoning problems) and other aquaculture 
practices as well as agricultural activities with similar wastewater problem. Thus the design 
expands the literature.  
In general, our results show that cooperation starts at low levels and improves over 
time with and without the MCA. Self-governance of laboratory shrimp farmers – university 
students play the role of shrimp farmers facing the wastewater problem – is possible to some 
extent. The MCA does not help to increase cooperation among farmers.  The results, hence, 
contribute partly to experimental literature on the possibility of using the MCA to solve a 
public bad and on the possibility of self-governance of laboratory shrimp farmers.  
 
 
40 
The next section of this chapter describes our experiment design. Then, experimental 
procedure is described. Following this, results are reported.  And finally, discussion of the 
results, the implications of the results and some concluding remarks is presented in the last 
section. 
3.2. Experimental Design 
Laboratory shrimp farmers are randomly and anonymously assigned to different river 
channels (henceforth rivers, similar to Cardenas et al., 2008 language). Each river comprises 
one upstream and one downstream group. Each group has three farmers. Once assigned, 
group composition remains the same to the end of the experiment. There are 2 Phases and a 
Questionnaire in each treatment. Each Phase consists of 10 rounds.  At the beginning of each 
round, each farmer receives an endowment of 20 experimental currency units (ECUs)9, and 
has to decide how much (any integer from 0 to 20) to contribute to wastewater treatment. If a 
group’s total contribution reaches 30ECUs, the threshold for wastewater treatment, the water 
in this group area is cleaned; each farmer of the group will get a fixed amount of additional 
payment which differs between the 2 treatments. If a group’s total contribution does not reach 
the threshold, the water in this group area is still polluted so that any positive contributions 
are lost and each farmer only receives what they have kept.   Moreover, in any river and in a 
given round, if the upstream group’s total contribution does not reach the threshold, each of 
the downstream group members would be affected and therefore gets their payoff reduced by 
10ECUs. At the end of each round, each farmer is informed of the results of the current 
round. Particularly, they are informed of their own contribution, total contribution of their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Farmers in the field may differ in terms of wealth, we think, however, it is appropriate to start our experiment 
with homogeneous endowments since wastewater treatments are viable options and there is low interest loan 
program for shrimp farmers, for which the farmers can use it to invest in wastewater treatment, which perhaps 
eliminates any heterogeneous endowment effect. In addition, it is also good to start with simplest possible 
environment, which allows us to study the effect of policy instruments in isolation and to form a foundation for 
a more complex environment. 
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own group, additional payment, payoff, and accumulated payoff. Downstream farmers are 
also informed of the possible effect from pollution produced upstream. 
The two treatments are designed to have the same cooperative equilibrium10 (i.e., the 
wastewater of a group is treated properly) so that the effect of the MCA’s presence can be 
observed. On the other hand, if farmers are not cooperative their payoff will be reduced 
further with the MCA compared to the case without the MCA. Therefore, any difference in 
cooperation between the two treatments would be a result from the presence of the MCA. In 
the baseline treatment (BL), Phase 2 is identical to Phase 1. If the total contribution of a 
group is at least 30ECUs, each group member will get an additional payment of 20ECUs; 
otherwise, each gets 0ECU. In the treatment with the MCA (FF, to refer that in this treatment, 
farmers need to pay a fixed fee to the MCA whenever it presents) Phase 2 is identical to 
Phase 1 of BL. In Phase 1 of FF, every participant has to pay a fixed fee of 3ECUs to the 
MCA; the MCA will put a seal of pollution level on shrimp package for each member of a 
group after observing the level of pollution of the group (either upstream or downstream), 
particularly, if the total contribution of a group is less than 30ECUs meaning that the water of 
the group’s area is not cleaned, the MCA will issue a high pollution seal and each member of 
the group will get an additional payment of −4ECUs; otherwise, the MCA applies low or no 
pollution seal and each member of the group will get additional payment of 23ECUs. 
 At the river level, for each round, if farmers are cooperative and the Pareto efficient 
equilibrium is achieved their total payoff (for 3 upstream and 3 downstream farmers) would 
be 180ECUs (i.e. 90ECUs for the upstream group + 90ECUs for the downstream group) in 
each of the 4 Phases. If they play non-cooperatively, the equilibrium total payoff would be 
90ECUs (i.e. 60ECUs of the upstream group + 30ECUs of the downstream group) in each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Cooperative equilibrium is where a group’s contribution equals a threshold; in this context a group’s 
contribution equals 30ECUs. On the other hand, non-cooperative equilibrium is where a group’s contribution is 
zero ECU. 
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round in the Phases without the MCA and it would be 48ECUs (i.e. 39ECUs of the upstream 
group + 9ECUs of the downstream group) in the Phase with the MCA (i.e. FF Phase 1). 
Table 8 summarizes cooperative and non-cooperative equilibrium outcomes for a river.  
Table 8. Cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes for a river for each round 
 BL treatment FF treatment 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2 
Total payoff for 
a river (ECUs) 
Cooperative outcome 180 180 180 180 
Non-cooperative outcome 90 90 48 90 
 
At group level, on the non-cooperative equilibrium (i.e. each farmer contributes zero 
ECU), the total payoff will be 60ECUs and 30ECUs for an upstream group and for a 
downstream group, respectively; at the Pareto equilibrium (i.e. each farmer contributes 
10ECUs), the total payoff will be 90ECUs and 90ECUs for an upstream group and for a 
downstream group, respectively, in Phases without the MCA. In FF Phase 1, at the non-
cooperative equilibrium (i.e. each farmer contributes zero ECU), the total payoff will be 
39ECUs and 9ECUs for an upstream group and for a downstream group, respectively; at the 
Pareto equilibrium (i.e. each farmer contributes 10ECUs), the total payoff will be 90ECUs 
and 90ECUs for an upstream group and for a downstream group, respectively. 
In brief, payoff functions for each Phase in each treatment are summarized as follows: 
In Phase 1 of BL treatment, in any given round payoff of farmer i is defined as: 
  For an upstream group farmer: !!! = 20−!! + !!                           (4) 
          For a downstream group farmer:  !!! = 20−!! + !! − !!"              (5) 
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where Wi represents farmer i’s contribution to wastewater treatment, Rw represents the 
possible additional payment and Rup represents the possible effect of pollution generated 
upstream to downstream farmers, that is:  
                            !! = 20, !"  !"#$%#  ! ′!  !"#$!′!  !"!#$  !"#$%&'($&"# ≥ 30                                  0, !"ℎ!"#$%!                                                                                                                                                                                                        !!" = 0, !"  !ℎ!  !"!#$  !"#$%&'($&"#  !"  !ℎ!  !"#$%&'(  !"#$%  !"  !"  !"#!"  30                      10, !"ℎ!"#$%!                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Phase 2 of BL is exactly the same as Phase 1. 
In Phase 1 of FF treatment, payoff of farmer i in any given round is defined as: 
           For an upstream group farmer: !!! = 20−!! + !!!"# − !              (6) 
     For a downstream group farmer:  !!! = 20−!! + !!!"# − ! − !!"      (7) 
where F represents the fixed fee everyone has to pay to the MCA, and RwMCA now differs 
from Rw in terms of value, that is:         
                                     !!!"# = 23, !"  !"#$%#  !′!  !"#$!′!  !"!#$  !"#$%&'($&"# ≥ 30                  −4, !!ℎ!"#$%!                                                                                                                                                                   
                 F = 3     
            Phase 2 of FF treatment is identical to Phase 1 of BL treatment.  
Table 9 summarizes the treatments and payoffs. Examples of screenshot for 
contribution stages are shown on Figure 4 and 5, respectively, for BL and FF’s Phase 1. 
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Table 9. Summary of treatments and payoff functions 
Treatment Phase Payoff for an upstream farmer and a downstream farmer of a river 
BL 
Phase 1 
!!! = 20−!! + !!                           (4) !!! = 20−!! + !! − !!"               (5) 
Phase 2 
!!! = 20−!! + !!                           (4) !!! = 20−!! + !! − !!"               (5) 
FF 
Phase 1 
!!! = 20−!! + !!!"# − !               (6) !!! = 20−!! + !!!"# − ! − !!"    (7) 
Phase 2 
!!! = 20−!! + !!                            (4) !!! = 20−!! + !! − !!"                (5) 
	  
	  
Figure 4. Screenshot of contribution to wastewater treatment stage of BL 
 
 
 
45 
	  
Figure 5. Screenshot of contribution to wastewater treatment stage of FF's Phase 1 
3.2.1. Theoretical Predictions 
In step-level public goods games, there are 2 types of equilibria: non-cooperative and 
cooperative. In the former, everyone contributes zero (i.e. group’s contribution is 0ECU), 
whereas in the latter the group as a whole contribute the minimum amount such that the 
public goods is provided (i.e. group’s contribution is 30ECUs). The motivation to free ride is 
very little in step-level public goods games because it is very hard for one participant to 
reduce its contribution without causing the public good not to be provided. There is a 
symmetric cooperative Nash equilibrium where each group member contributes 10EUCs and 
multiple asymmetric cooperative equilibria where the group’s contribution equals 30ECUs 
and the individual contributions are not equal. Reputation-building behaviour is not possible 
in our design because farmers are not informed about individual contributions. Following the 
folk theorem or backward induction there are also non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria 
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for the repeated game, that is, there are the same non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria 
in each round of the game.  
The MCA does not change the cooperative equilibrium payoffs but lowers the non-
cooperative equilibrium payoffs since the MCA is costly and will inform high pollution level 
to shrimp consumers, which negatively affects payoffs of farmers. Thus, the MCA should 
induce farmers to move toward to the cooperative equilibrium since farmers have to pay fixed 
fee to the MCA in any case and their payoff gets reduced if they do not cooperate, or even 
worse (possibly negative payoff) if they contribute but their group’s total contribution does 
not reach the threshold.  
3.2.3. Hypotheses 
Based on the predictions, we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: with the presence of the MCA, farmers are more cooperative. As a 
result, rivers get cleaned more often (both upstream and downstream groups of a river invest 
enough to wastewater treatment) in FF Phase 1 than in BL Phase 1. 
Hypothesis 2: in Phase 2 farmers would sustain the level of cooperation obtained in 
Phase 1 of BL and FF treatment (following Ostrom et al., 1992; Guillen et al., 2006). 
3.3. Experimental Procedure  
For the experiment, 120 students of the University of Sydney,11 Australia, were 
recruited through the Online Recruitment System for Economics Experiments, ORSEE 
(Greiner, 2004). There are 2 sessions for each treatment. In each session, 5 upstream groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 12 students (equivalent to 2 independent observations) were dropped out of the analysis as a result of 2 
students participated twice in 2 treatments.   
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of 3 students and 5 downstream groups of 3 students played the step-level public goods game 
together. The experiment was computerized and programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
When arriving at the lab, students were randomly assigned to a computer and received 
the instructions. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were told that there are 2 
Phases and a Questionnaire and they were given written instructions for Phase 1. Once Phase 
1 was finished they were given instructions for Phase 2. The same experimenter (for all 
sessions) read the instructions to participants and before each Phase started. Several control 
questions were added in order to ensure that all participants understood the instructions (see 
APPENDICES). Each session lasted for about 90 minutes including payment time.  
At the end of the experiment, each subject was privately paid the total amount they 
earned in Phases 1 and 2. The exchange rate was 5 AUD cents for 1 ECU. Average payments 
are AU$21.5 and AU$19.4 for BL and FF treatment, respectively.   
3.4. Results 
In this section we analyze the data and report results for cooperation at the river and 
group levels and relate them to the proposed hypotheses. Before the analysis, it is useful to 
reiterate our terminology. At river level, each river has an upstream group and a downstream 
group. At group level, both downstream and upstream groups have 3 shrimp farmers each. In 
BL Phases 1, 2 and FF Phase 2 subjects played exactly the same step-level public goods 
game without the MCA. In FF Phase 1, subjects played the step-level public goods game with 
the MCA. Unless otherwise stated, tests for statistically significant differences between 2 
samples are by the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test.  
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3.4.1. Cooperation at river level  
  Table 10. Percentage of times contribution of both group of a river reached the threshold 
Treatment Phase 1 Phase 2 (identical co Phase 1 of BL) 
BL 39%  41% 
FF 21% 44% 
In both treatments the percentage of times (i.e. success proportion) a river was 
cleaned – the threshold was reached by both the upstream and downstream groups – was less 
than 50% in both Phases. Table 10 shows the percentage of time the contribution of both 
groups of a river reached the threshold. The percentage of times a river was cleaned in Phase 
2 was higher than that in Phase 1 for both treatments. With the MCA, the rivers were cleaned 
less frequently than without it.  
    	  
Figure 6. Average payoff (ECUs) at river level per period 
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Figure 7. Average success at group level per period 
It is easy to see that for each round, if farmers on a river cooperate (e.g. each 
contributes 10ECUs) the total payoff for the river would be 180ECUs (90ECUs for the 
upstream group + 90ECUs for the downstream group). On the other hand, if the farmers do 
not cooperate, the total payoff would be 90ECUs (60EUC for the upstream group + 30ECUs 
for the downstream group). Figure 6 shows the average payoff per round.  Payoff in Phase 1 
of BL and FF rose on average from 90ECUs and 22ECUs in round 1 to 130ECUs and 
102ECUs in round 10 respectively. On the other hand, payoffs in Phase 2 for both treatments 
were fairly stable over time at 132ECUs.  
Similar results were recorded for per period success proportion which measures the 
percentage of cleaned rivers in each round. Figure 7 illustrates the average success per round. 
On average, success proportion in BL and FF rose from 11% and 0% in round 1 to 44% and 
22% in round 10, respectively. Success proportion in Phase 2 in both treatments slightly 
fluctuated over time at 44%.  
Result 1: In the presence of the MCA famers are not more cooperative compared to BL, 
contrary to Hypothesis 1.  
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Table 11. Comparison of river's payoff and success proportion (the averaged of all periods) 
Comparison Payoff Success proportion 
 (1) Z-statistic (2) P value (3) Z-statistic (4) P value 
(1) BL Phase 1 vs FF Phase 1   1.192 0.2332   0.82 0.411 
(2) BL Phase 2 vs FF Phase 2   0.132 0.8946 −0.14 0.886 
(3) BL Phase 1 vs BL Phase 2^ −1.481 0.1386 −0.10 0.923 
(4) BL Phase 1 vs FF Phase 2 −0.662 0.5078 −0.24 0.811 
(5) FF Phase 1 vs FF Phase 2^ −2.547 0.0109** −1.05 0.292 
^ Wilcoxon signed-rank test; **significant at 5% 
Table 11, row (2), shows that there was no statistically significant difference in the 
payoff and success proportion of farmers at river level between Phase 1 BL and Phase 1 FF 
treatments, meaning that without the MCA farmers performed insignificantly better over ten 
periods compared to farmers with the MCA. The result is robust when comparing payoff and 
success proportion of farmers in BL Phase 1 and FF Phase 1 by round. Farmer’s payoffs in 
FF Phase 1 were only significantly lower in round 1 (p = 0.0054) and 3 (p = 0.0215) than 
farmers’ payoffs in BL Phase 1. Similarly, farmers’ success proportions in FF Phase 1 were 
only significantly smaller in round 3 (p=0.0228) than in BL Phase 1. That is, with the MCA 
farmers performed poorly in very early rounds compared to those without the MCA but later, 
once the MCA has disappeared, their performances converged.   
Moreover, Table 11, rows (2) and (4), show that there were no significant differences 
in payoffs and success proportions of farmers between FF Phase 2 and BL Phase 2 and 
between FF Phase 2 and BL Phase 1. In FF Phase 2, subjects played the same game (without 
the MCA) as in BL Phase 1 and 2 and their performance was similar to those in BL Phase 1 
and 2. All of the above confirms that the MCA does not help achieve cooperative equilibria 
more frequently.   
Result 2: farmers improve their cooperation over time in Phase 1 for both treatments.   
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Table 12. Dynamics of river's payoffa and success proportionb 
Payoff is dependent 
variable 
(1) BL Phase 1 
N = 90 
(2) BL Phase 2 
N = 90 
(3) FF Phase 1 
N = 90 
(4) FF Phase 2 
N = 90 
(1) Round 3.14*** (1.07) 
−0.13 
(0.77) 
7.01*** 
(1.51) 
1.42 
(1.05) 
(2) Constant 106.24*** (6.64) 
133.99*** 
(4.80) 
60.02*** 
(9.35) 
125.24*** 
(6.54) 
Success proportion is dependent variable (N=10) 
(3) Round 0.29** (0.01) 
−0.01 
(.001) 
0.32*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
(4) Constant 0.23** (0.07) 
0.46*** 
(0.03) 
0.31 
(0.05) 
0.40*** 
(0.07) 
**5%, ***1%; a: fixed effect panel regression, b: tobit regression12; standard errors in parentheses. 
To see the trend of payoff and cooperation level over time, payoffs and success 
proportions are regressed again round. The results are reported in Table 12. They show the 
trend that farmers in Phase 1 played non-cooperatively in round 1 but improved their 
cooperation later on (Figure 7a). Even though farmers with the MCA did not perform better 
than those without the MCA, as shown above, farmers with and without the MCA improved 
their performance over time. Table 12 columns (1) and (3) show that payoffs and success 
proportions of rivers increase over time in Phase 1 for both BL and FF treatments. With and 
without the MCA, at the start of the games, without knowing behaviours of other group 
members, farmers were reluctant to invest in wastewater treatment and hence cooperation 
levels were almost absent (success rates were 0.11 for BL Phase 1 and 0 for FF Phase 1). 
Then the cooperation levels increased to the end of Phase 1. However, the cooperation levels 
were still somehow low (less than 50%), meaning that there was a significant number of 
groups whose contribution did not reach the threshold.  
Result 3: it is possible for farmers to self-sustain cooperation levels in Phase 2, supporting 
Hypothesis 2. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Success proportion is censored between zero and one. 
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  Table 11 rows (3) and (5) show payoffs and success proportions of farmers in Phase 2 
were equal to those of farmers in Phase 1 for both treatments except that payoff of farmers in 
FF Phase 2 is significantly higher than that in FF Phase 1, suggesting that in Phase 2 of both 
treatments the same rivers sustained the cooperation attained in Phase 1 – indeed 5 out of 18 
rivers constantly sustained their cooperation. When comparing payoffs and success 
proportions between Phase 1 and Phase 2 for both treatments by round, differences in payoffs 
and success proportions between Phase 1 and 2 were significant only in round 1 (p = 0.0771 
and p = 0.0572 for BL; p = 0.0031 and p = 0.0117 for FF), indicating that at the start farmers 
performed better in Phase 2 than Phase 1 for both treatments. The result is more robust when 
looking at the dynamics of farmers’ payoffs and success proportions in Phase 2 of both 
treatments. Farmers’ payoffs and success rates neither fell nor went up significantly (Table 
12, column (2) and (4)), meaning that throughout Phase 2 farmers maintained their 
cooperation level achieved at the end of Phase 1. 
3.4.2. Cooperation at group level 
 Recall that 6 shrimp farmers (3 upstream and 3 downstream) form a river and 3 
shrimp farmers form either an upstream group or a downstream group of a river.  Having 
water of a river cleaned requires that both the upstream and the downstream group of the 
river contribute enough to wastewater treatment. Despite cooperation at river level is less 
likely to occur compared to that at group level, it is expected that cooperation at river and 
group level would have similar pattern. Thus this section would compare the behaviours of 
upstream and downstream groups. Figures 8 and 9 show that group level payoffs and 
cooperation patterns are very similar to those at river level. Cooperation and payoffs seem to 
improve over time in Phase 1 and remain stable in Phase 2 for both upstream and downstream 
groups for both treatments. However, the results for success rates at group level are mixed in 
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both Phases as shown in Table 13. Notably, the percentage of time downstream farmers 
reached the threshold is lower than that of upstream farmers in FF Phase 1, but it reverses in 
Phase 2. 
Table 13. Percentage of times a group's contribution reached the threshold 
Treatment Phase 1 Phase 2 
 (1) Up (2) Down (3) Up (4) Down 
(1) BL 54% 59% 59% 53% 
(2) FF 63% 37% 58% 69% 
 
Result 5: with the MCA, downstream farmers perform worse than upstream farmers. 
Table 14 shows comparisons in payoffs and success proportions between upstream 
and downstream groups for each Phase. There were no significant differences in payoff and 
success proportion between upstream and downstream farmers in BL Phase 1 and 2 (rows (1) 
and (2)). However, in FF Phase 1 downstream farmers were significantly less cooperative 
than upstream ones and thus the payoff of the downstream groups were less than that of the 
upstream groups, meaning that with the MCA downstream farmers did worse than upstream 
farmers (Table 14, row (3)). Moreover, when comparing round by round we found that 5 out 
of 10 rounds13, downstream groups were significantly less cooperative than upstream groups 
in Phase 1 of FF treatment. This result is robust as the significant difference in the level of 
cooperation and payoff between upstream and downstream farmers in FF Phase 1 no longer 
existed in FF Phase 2 (Table 14, row (4)).  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Round 3, 5, 7, 8, 9 with p value of .0786, .0735, .0289, .0735, .0735, respectively.  
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Table 14. Comparison of group's payoff and success proportion 
Comparison Payoff Success proportion 
 (1) Z-statistic (2) P value (3) Z-statistic (4) P value 
(1) BL Phase 1: down vs up −1.457 0.1451 −0.29 0.3877 
(2) BL Phase 2 : down vs up −0.0928 0.3536 −0.52 0.3007 
(3) FF Phase 1: down vs up −2.076 0.0379** −1.84 0.0330** 
(4) FF Phase 2: down vs up −1.106 0.2687 −0.98 0.1640 
**significant at 5% 
Result 4: In the presence of the agency, farmers in both upstream and downstream groups 
improve their cooperation and payoff over time. Compared to the case without the 
agency, this is consistent with river level for FF Phase 1 but not for BL Phase 1. 
Table 15. Dynamics of group's payoff c and success proportiond 
Payoff  BL Phase 1 (1) BL Phase 2 (2) FF Phase 1 (3) FF Phase 2 (4) 
Up 
N=90 
Down 
N=90 
Up 
N=90 
Down 
N=90 
Up 
N=90 
Down 
N=90 
Up 
N=90 
Down 
N=90 
Round 1.791*** 
(0.475) 
1.346 
(0.867) 
0.115 
(0.394) 
−0.249 
(0.620) 
2.982*** 
(0.872) 
4.03*** 
(0.832) 
0.433 
(0.495) 
0.983 
(0.747) 
Constant 59.86*** 
(2.949) 
46.38*** 
(5.382) 
72.31*** 
(2.447) 
61.68*** 
(3.847) 
46.62*** 
(5.414) 
13.39*** 
(5.167) 
69.72*** 
(3.076) 
55.52*** 
(4.640) 
Success proportion (N=10) 
Round 0.015 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.019) 
−0.007 
(0.005) 
−0.016* 
(0.008) 
0.038* 
(0.017) 
0.024** 
(0.008) 
−0.009 
(0.006) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
Constant  0.463*** 
(0.058) 
0.511*** 
(0.120) 
0.633*** 
(0.031) 
0.619*** 
(0.050) 
0.424*** 
(0.108) 
0.242*** 
(0.050) 
0.628*** 
(0.043) 
0.626*** 
0.077) 
*10%, **5%, ***1%; c: fixed effect panel regression, d: tobit regression  
Similar to river level, to see the trend of each type of groups over time, using fixed 
effect panel regression and Tobit regression payoffs and success proportions are estimated, 
respectively. Table 15 shows regression results for farmers’ payoffs and success proportions 
by round. Without the MCA (BL Phase 1), upstream and downstream farmers do not 
significantly improve their cooperation over time. The cooperation levels fluctuated around 
50%. The cooperation level of downstream farmers was significantly lower than that of 
upstream farmers only in round 1 and 10 (p = 0.0519 and p = 0.0912, respectively). Similar 
results occurred in BL Phase 2 and FF Phase 2. That is, cooperation levels of downstream and 
upstream farmers were fairly stable overtime at around 60% and there was no significant 
 
 
55 
difference in cooperation levels between downstream and upstream farmers in each of the 10 
rounds.  
    
   	  
Figure 8. Average payoff (ECUs) at group level per round 
In contrast, with the MCA (FF Phase 1) upstream and downstream groups were 
significantly more cooperative over time and therefore their payoffs also improved over time 
(Table 15, column (3)). In brief, at the river and group levels, in the presence of the MCA, 
farmers improved their cooperation over time. However, when compared to farmers in BL, 
farmers in FF Phase 1 did not perform better. This confirms the result 1 above that the MCA 
did not help to increase farmer’s cooperation. 
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Figure 9. Average success at group level per round 
Result 6: some groups of both upstream and downstream farmers manage to sustain 
cooperation.  
When comparing groups between Phase 1 and Phase 2 for each treatment, there is no 
significant difference in payoffs and success proportions between Phase 1 and Phase 2 for 
upstream groups for both treatments. A similar pattern is found for downstream groups for 
BL treatment. However, FF downstream groups become significantly more cooperative in 
Phase 2 than in Phase 1 (p = 0.0929). The results show that some groups (17 out of 36 for 
both treatments) of downstream and upstream farmers in Phase 2 sustain the cooperation 
attained in Phase 1. 
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3.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Our findings are: (1) the MCA does not help farmers in solving the wastewater 
problem; (2) with and without the MCA, farmers’ cooperation is quite low at the beginning 
but improves over time to the end of the game; (3) self-governance is possible among some 
laboratory shrimp farmers, that is once the farmers successfully cooperate they sustain the 
cooperation level in Phase 2 of the game.   
In particular, in Phase 1 for both treatments, farmers’ cooperation at the river level 
starts at a very low level and then improves over time, which is opposite to the results found 
by Guillen et al. (2006) where cooperation level starts high and decreases over time. It is an 
interesting difference in contrast with results suggested by Andreoni (1995) that participants’ 
contribution is positively related to a positive framing but negatively related to a negative 
framing.  In fact, a positive framing is used in our experiment: subjects acted as shrimp 
farmers and each decided how much money to invest in wastewater treatment, which is 
targeted to solve the pollution problem. In other words, farmers’ decision to cooperate would 
be good for the farmers and the environment and hence it is a good thing. The experiment in 
Guillen et al. (2006) was neutrally framed. We think that strategic uncertainty14 is more 
salient in our experiment than that in Guillen’s et al. (2006) experiment, and that may be 
causing the difference. Indeed, cooperation at the river level in our experiment is less likely 
to be achieved than cooperation in Guillen’s et al. (2006) experiment because it involves two 
groups (upstream and downstream group) while there is only one group in Guillen’s et al. 
(2006) experiment. In Phase 1, some farmers who initially do not know about the behaviour 
of other members contribute poorly but later, when they receive signals from other members, 
they cooperate more and as a result rivers get cleaned more often. This behaviour is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See Messick et al. (1988) for further discussion on strategic uncertainty.  
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consistent with uncertainty aversion in the sense that behaviours of other members are 
unknown to a farmer so it is risky for the farmer to cooperate (i.e. contribute 10ECUs) in the 
first round, hence contributing nothing is better regardless of the result in the first place. 
Especially in FF Phase 1, farmers can possibly get negative payoffs if they cooperate and 
other members don’t, so it is likely that farmers who are loss averse15 are more reluctant to 
cooperate. In addition, aside from the difference in group’s composition discussed above, 
another factor that may contribute to the difference in cooperation is that the MCA looks at 
group performance while the CSM looks at individual performance. Nonetheless, cooperation 
level in our experiments improving over time is a notable result, contrasting to that of most of 
standard public goods experiments. 
 In contrast to some of the existing research on certification (e.g. Cason and 
Gangadharan, 2002; Burfurd et al., 2012), our certification agency does not help improve the 
market outcome (i.e. cooperation level in the SLPG game). This may be explained by the 
difference of the contexts used here (i.e. SLPG games) and used in the existing research (i.e. 
markets) and by the difference of performances that is, the agency in this chapter certifies 
base on group’s performances while the agency in the existing research certifies base on 
individual performances. 
At the group level, downstream and upstream farmers are found to improve their 
cooperation over time only in FF Phase 1. In fact, with the MCA everyone has more incentive 
to cooperate. At the beginning, farmers with and without the MCA are facing the same 
uncertainty about the behaviour of other group members. With the MCA, however, farmers’ 
cooperative behaviour (i.e. 10ECUs contribution) now becomes riskier since if one of the 
other members does not cooperate, payoff for the farmer gets worse than those facing the 
same situation but without the MCA. Hence, it may be that due to loss aversion and strategic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See Kahneman et. al. (1991) for further discussion on loss aversion.  
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uncertainty in FF Phase 1 farmers at both group levels reluctantly cooperate at the start of the 
game. As suggested by Fehr and Gächter (2000), cooperation improves overtime when 
punishment is available. The MCA in our experiment has twofold: rewarding and sanctioning 
function, which may help enhancing the cooperation level over ten periods.  
Moreover, we think that loss aversion and strategic uncertainty also explains why 
downstream farmers perform worse than upstream farmers when the MCA is there and 
supposed to help. Downstream farmers now are facing higher possible losses than upstream 
farmers since the upstream farmers’ noncooperation will negatively affect downstream 
farmers’ payoff. Thus, this loss aversion associated with the strategic uncertainty restricts 
downstream farmers’ cooperation further compared to upstream ones.  This is a notable result 
since with the MCA, for downstream farmers, loss aversion and strategic uncertainty may 
outweigh the good of the MCA and intensify the uncertainty about other group members’ 
behaviour. In other words, if a downstream farmer cooperates and the other group members 
as well as the upstream group do not, the farmer would be likely (i) more disadvantaged with 
the MCA than without it and (ii) worse than the farmer’s counterpart upstream farmer. 
Up to some level of cooperation achieved at the end of Phase 1, some groups of 
farmers sustain this level in Phase 2. This is true for both group and river levels, suggesting 
that the possibility of self-governance of the farmers is high. In fact, once cooperation is 
attained, no one will be better off by deviating, and 17 out of 36 groups and 5 out of 18 rivers 
managed to achieve that. This may be explained by learning effect that is, farmers learn that 
they are better off to cooperate in Phase 1 and hence continue to do so in Phase 2. The result 
is consistent with findings by Ostrom et al. (1992) and Guillen et al. (2006). This is an 
encouraging result indicating that when everyone in a river cooperates they continue to do so 
for longer periods. Apparently, cooperation can resolve the pollution problem and farmers 
can enjoy production in a more sustainable way. However, the level of cooperation is still 
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quite low at the end of Phase 1 for both treatments. Loss aversion associated with uncertainty 
about behaviours of other members may place a big constraint on contribution of farmers at 
the start of the game, which also triggers cooperation failure of farmers in latter rounds. 
Therefore, the uncertainty may lead to coordination problem among group members, which is 
consistent with a finding by Messick et al. (1988). This also explains why farmers commence 
the games poorly and why the cooperation level is still low in both Phases of the 2 treatments.  
Generally, BL treatment is equivalent to a simple mechanism that is to inform the 
farmers about the pollution problems and how to avoid it; then to let the farmers self-resolve 
the problem. Some of groups of farmers voluntarily cooperate and sustain the cooperation 
level. The MCA in FF treatment is supposed to help but could not improve the cooperation 
level of the farmers compared to that of BL treatment. Thus, our results suggest that MCA 
alone cannot promote widespread cooperation and that some farmers successfully self-
govern. Indeed, as pointed out in Tran and Bush’s (2010) study that some form of 
community-based solutions (e.g. cooperatives) has been recently detected in the MRD by 
shrimp farmers for a more responsible and sustainable shrimp aquaculture.  
In summary, farmers cooperate more over time in Phase 1 and sustain the cooperation 
level in Phase 2 for both treatments. Loss aversion associated with strategic uncertainty may 
play an important role in explaining the observed patterns of the cooperation. We believe that 
a similar mechanism with an extra function (e.g., communication) mitigating the strategic 
uncertainty would help farmers in solving the pollution problem. Thus, in the next chapter, 
we will focus on the possibility of using communication as a tool to promote cooperation of 
the shrimp farmers facing the pollution problem.  
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CHAPTER 4: COMMUNICATION AS A TOOL TO PROMOTE 
COOPERATION: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 
4.1. Introduction 
Pollution is one of the most obvious public bads and its effects have been widely 
documented. Air pollution, for instance, caused by manufacturing companies or bushfires not 
only imposes negative impact on the area where these activities happen but also globally. 
Similarly, water pollution caused by aquaculture or agricultural activities negatively affects 
both the activity area and downstream areas. A number of other upstream-downstream 
problems (e.g. water use, industrial/municipal water source pollution, salinity zoning 
problems) are also nice examples of the negative externality. Many of these problems can be 
characterized as non-point source pollution in which pollution caused by each individual 
polluter is either prohibitively costly or impossible to observe. In either case, it is more 
feasible to measure the pollution at the aggregate level.  
Managing non-point source pollution has thus been attracting much attention from 
around the world.  A number of solutions have been proposed including market-based 
mechanisms (e.g. McGarland and Oates, 1985) and institutional regulations (e.g. Segerson, 
1988).16  Non-point source pollution is indeed mitigated whenever efforts taken by all 
polluters in reducing pollution reach a certain level. Hence reducing non-point source 
pollution shares the characteristics of a step-level public goods game. However, where 
market institutions and law enforcement are weak, especially in developing countries, a 
community-based approach seems to be the most appropriate tool (Russell and Vaughan, 
2003).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Shortle and Horan (2001) give a comprehensive survey of market-based and formal regulations instruments 
tackling non-point source pollutions. This chapter focuses on informal regulations. 
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An important focus of the community-based solution is the cooperation of 
stakeholders. Previous studies have found some laboratory and field evidence of cooperative 
behaviour. For instance, Ostrom et al. (1992) study the possibility of self-governance of 
experimental subjects facing the tragedy of the commons problem. It was observed that it is 
possible for appropriators to attain self-governance, that is, appropriators are able to maintain 
the level of cooperation achieved before the removal of any policy interventions. Similarly, 
Guillen’s et al. (2006) study supports this result. On the other hand, Cardenas et al. (2008) 
proposed three resource-specific games (a water irrigation game, a forestry game, and a 
fisheries game) reflecting the tragedy of the commons facing stakeholders. The games were 
played in the field. They observed that the field participants were not cooperative. However, 
the paper did not suggest any solution to improve the situation. Chapter 3 of this thesis 
described a step-level public goods game to study cooperative behaviour of shrimp farmers 
facing wastewater pollution problem. It was found that even with an incentive (offered by the 
monitoring and certification agency), farmers did not achieve full cooperation in solving the 
wastewater pollution resulting from shrimp farming but we also found self-governance of the 
farmers was possible.  
This chapter explores further the possibility of using pre-play, nonbinding 
communication (aka cheap-talk, henceforth used interchangeably) as a solution to the 
problem facing upstream and downstream shrimp farmers studied in Chapter 3. In previous 
studies, cheap-talk communication has proved to be an effective tool for mitigating social 
dilemmas (Ostrom et al.,1992; Sally, 1995; Bochet et al., 2006); reducing principal-agent 
problems (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006 & 2011), and solving coordination problems 
(Cooper et al., 1992; Chan et al., 1999; Blume and Ortmann, 2007). Nonetheless, little is 
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known about the effect of communication on cooperation of stakeholders facing non-point 
resource pollution17. The results of the current chapter fill this gap.  
In order to do this, the results of baseline treatment (BL) in Chapter 3 are compared to 
two additional treatments namely, a communication treatment with imperfect or private 
information of endowment (CL) and a communication treatment with perfect or public 
information of endowment (CU). There are two Phases in each treatment. Phase 2 differs 
from Phase 1 with respect to a communication opportunity for the CU and CL treatments. In 
particular, farmers no longer have the chance to communicate in Phase 2. Phase 2 of CU is 
exactly the same as Phase 1 and 2 of BL. Phase 2 of CL is similar to Phase 2 of CU except 
that endowments are private information in Phase 2 of CL.  Comparing Phase 1 and Phase 2 
for each treatment allows us to see the possibility of self-governance of the laboratory shrimp 
farmers. 
All parameters are the same for the three treatments. However, there are some 
important differences among Phase 1 treatments deserving of some discussion: 
(1) The key difference between CL or CU and BL is that, in each period, farmers in each 
group (upstream or downstream) are given an opportunity to communicate via an 
anonymous chat room. Farmers are not allowed to identify themselves by name, 
computer number or appearance in the chat room. This procedure minimizes any side 
effects (e.g. side payments, threats, reputation building) and preserves the fact that 
individual pollution (or individual effort to reduce pollution) is hard to observe. Thus, 
comparing CL or CU to BL gives us the effect of communication on cooperation. 
(2) The CU differs from the CL treatment to the extent that in CL farmers only know 
endowments privately. That is, each farmer knows only his/her own endowment in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 One exception is Vossler et al. (2006) which studies the effect of communication on the performance of 
groups facing non-point source polluters in the presence of institutional regulations, fixed fines and 
taxes/subsidies. Their results show that communication improves efficiency of fixed fine instruments but 
reduces the efficiency of marginal tax/subsidy instruments. The present paper focuses on the effect of 
communication on cooperative behaviour of non-point source polluters facing no external regulations.   
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CL treatment whereas endowments are common knowledge to all farmers in CU. In the 
field, shrimp farmers may best know their own budget constraint but not their 
neighbors’. Hence, comparing CU Phase 1 and CL Phase 1 allows us to see the 
robustness of the communication effect. 
Literature of the effect of unstructured communication on step-level public goods 
games is very limited. There are a number of previous studies on the effect of 
communication, heterogeneity of endowments and private information on endowments on 
voluntary contributions in standard public goods games. For instance, Ledyard (1995) 
surveys experiments on public goods games. The paper concludes that incomplete 
information will increase voluntary contributions and heterogeneity will reduce contributions. 
Chan et al., (1999), motivated by an observation in the field, study the effects of 
heterogeneity and incomplete information with and without communication on voluntary 
contribution in a public goods game. The results show that: (1) heterogeneity and 
communication deteriorates the cooperation level; (2) incomplete information lowers 
contributions in a homogenous environment, and; (3) heterogeneity increases contributions 
when information is incomplete. The results of this chapter are complementary to these 
papers and contribute partly to the literature, especially to the step-level public goods 
literature and the effect of communication.  
Moreover, the effect of the interaction between unstructured communication and 
private information on the step-level public goods game has not been documented before. 
Thus, in the current chapter, the effect of the interaction should contribute partly to the 
literature. That is, it contributes empirically the effect of unstructured communication and 
private information on cooperation level in SLPG games.  Even though endowments are the 
same for all farmers in the CL treatment, farmers may have heterogeneous perceptions about 
endowments of their group members. With communication, subjects may act strategically to 
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earn a higher profit by lying about their endowments.  In a study by Chan et al. (1999), 
subjects had face-to-face communication and it was not clear if any subjects acted 
strategically by lying. Similarly, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) test the effect of pre-play 
communication in a public goods game with private information about endowments. Prior to 
making their contribution, subjects can send either an “I intend to contribute” or an “I do not 
intend to contribute” message, then they each decide whether to contribute their entire 
endowments. If at least two members of a group of three contribute, each group member gets 
an additional payment. Overall, they observe that there is no difference in payoffs for subjects 
playing the games with and without communication and that subjects’ contributions are 
sensitive to the number of messages saying “I intend to contribute” sent by group members. 
Furthermore, subjects did not reverse the meanings of the 2 messages. Analogously, 
Parkhurst et al., (2004) investigated the effects of repetition and limited communication (no 
more than one message is allowed) on coordination failure. They observe that repetition with 
communication intensifies coordination failure and that repetition without communication 
lowers coordination failure. In a sender and receiver game studied by Gneezy (2005), results 
show that when a sender’s gain is a receiver’s loss, the sender’s probability of lying increases 
with the potential gains to the sender and deceases with the potential loss to the receiver.  
In brief, even though the effect of communication has been studied extensively in 
literature our experiment is novel because few previous experiments have studied the effect 
of communication and limited information on cooperation of laboratory participants playing 
step-level public goods games with pollution context as reviewed above. 
The next section will describe our experimental design, followed by the experimental 
procedure, results, discussion and conclusion. 
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4.2. Experimental Design 
As noted earlier, there are three treatments (BL, CU and CL) and each comprises two 
Phases and a Questionnaire. Each Phase has 10 rounds. Laboratory shrimp farmers are 
anonymously and randomly assigned to either upstream or downstream locations and each 
group has three members. There is one upstream and one downstream group per river. Once 
assigned, farmers interact with the same group members in the same river to the end of the 
experiment. At the beginning of each round, farmers are given an endowment of 20ECUs, 
which is private information in the CL treatment. Farmers need to decide how much to invest 
in wastewater treatment and their contributions are restricted to integer amounts. In addition 
for the CU and CL treatments, farmers are given 2 minutes to communicate to their upstream 
or downstream group members prior to making their decision. The only restriction imposed 
on communication is that farmers are not allowed to reveal their identity.  
Figure 10 shows the screenshot of the chat box for CL Phase 1; the screenshot is 
similar but there is no information about endowment for CU Phase 1. Phase 2 is exactly the 
same as Phase 1 of BL. But in Phase 2 for CU and CL, farmers no longer have the 
opportunity to communicate and they have public and private information of endowments, 
respectively. Table 14 summarizes the experimental design.      
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Figure 10. An example of screenshot of the chat box 
     Table 16. Experimental design 
Treatment Number of 
rounds 
Information about 
endowments 
Communication 
(via chat room) 
BL (adopted from Chapter 3) Phase 1 10 Public No 
Phase 2 10 Public No 
CL Phase 1 10 Private Yes 
Phase 2 10 Private No 
CU Phase 1 10 Public Yes 
Phase 2 10 Public No 
 
If the total contribution of a group is at least 30ECUs, the pollution in the area is 
mitigated and each group member receives an additional payment of 20ECUs. Otherwise, 
nobody in the group gets any additional payment. On top of that, in each river, downstream 
farmers are negatively affected by pollution produced upstream. Specifically, each 
downstream farmer’s payoff is reduced by 10ECUs if the total contribution of the upstream 
group is less than 30ECUs; otherwise, downstream farmers are not affected. At the end of 
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each round, each farmer is informed of the results of the current round. In particular, they are 
informed about their own contribution, the total contribution of their own group, as well as 
additional payments, payoffs, and accumulated payoffs. Downstream farmers are also 
informed of the possible effect from pollution produced upstream. The payoff to each farmer 
for each round can be summarized as follows: 
      For an upstream group farmer:                                !!! = !! −!! + !!                                          (8) 
For a downstream group farmer:  !!! = !! −!! + !! − !!"                            (9) 
where Ei represents farmer i’s endowment, Wi represents farmer i’s contribution to 
wastewater treatment, Rw represents the possible additional payment and Rup represents the 
possible effect of pollution generated upstream to downstream farmers. It follows that:  
                !! = 20, !"  !"#$%#  ! ′!  !"#$!′!  !"!#$  !"#$%&'($&"# ≥ 30                                                                                          0, !"ℎ!"#$%!                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            !!" = 0, !"  !ℎ!  !"!#$  !"#$%&'($&"#  !"  !ℎ!  !"#$%&'(  !"#$%  !"  !"  !"#$%  30                      10, !"ℎ!"#$%!                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
       Ei = 20, shown only in BL and CU treatments. 
 At the river level, a Pareto optimal outcome (i.e., the pollution problem is solved) is 
achieved when both the upstream and downstream groups’ contributions in each round reach 
30EUCs. Thus, the optimal payoff for the whole river is 180 ECUs in each round. If farmers 
don’t cooperate (i.e. each contributes 0ECU), the total payoff for a river is 90EUCs in each 
round. 
At the group level, if farmers don’t cooperate (i.e. each contributes 0ECU), the 
payoffs are 60ECUs for an upstream group and 30ECUs for a downstream group. On the 
other hand, if farmers cooperate (i.e. each contributes 10 ECUs), an upstream group would 
get the same payoff of 90ECUs as a downstream group. Equilibrium payoffs are the same for 
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all 3 treatments. Table 17 summarizes cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes for a river 
per round for each treatment.  
Table 17. Cooperative and non-cooperative outcome for a river per round 
Treatment Phase Cooperative outcome Non-cooperative outcome 
BL 1 180 90 
2 180 90 
CL 1 180 90 
2 180 90 
CU 1 180 90 
2 180 90 
 
4.2.1. Theoretical Predictions 
There are the same two types of equilibria for one-shot and repeated step-level public 
good games: the non-cooperative equilibrium (i.e. total contribution of a group is zero ECU) 
and the cooperative equilibrium (i.e. total contribution of a group is 30 ECUs). As noted 
earlier, the three treatments have the same parameters and therefore the same equilibria. 
However, in Chapter 3, the results show that strategic uncertainty leads to coordination 
failure that deteriorates cooperation	   to some extent. Farrell and Rabin (1996) argue that 
communication can convey information and hence improve outcomes for interest-aligned 
agents. With communication, farmers may thus be more likely to overcome coordination 
problems and hence the optimal outcome is more likely to be achieved. Furthermore, when 
endowments are private information and communication is anonymous, it is likely harder for 
farmers to cooperate since they can lie about their own endowment and hence contribute less 
in order to generate higher profit. 
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4.2.2. Hypotheses 
Based on the predictions, we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: farmers cooperate more with communication.  
 Hypothesis 4: farmers manage to sustain cooperation with communication. In other 
words, self-governance of farmers is also possible with communication. 
 Hypothesis 5: with communication, when endowments are private information less 
cooperation occurs than with public information. 
4.3. Experimental Procedure 
Volunteers were recruited through ORSEE (see Chapter 3 and Greiner, 2004). In 
total, 114 University of Sydney students participated in the two treatments (CU with 60 
participants and CL with 54 participants). There were two sessions per treatment and no 
subject participated in more than one session. All treatments were programmed in zTree 
(Fischbacher, 2007).	  	  
Once at the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned to a computer terminal. 
Subjects were told at the beginning of each session that there were two Phases and a 
questionnaire and that communication is strictly not allowed except via the chat room. 
Instructions for Phase 1 were handed out to each subject. Once Phase 1 was finished all 
subjects were given instruction for Phase 2.  The experimenter also read aloud the 
instructions. Before each Phase, there were 5 control questions to ensure that all subjects fully 
understood the instructions (see APPENDICES).  Each session lasted about 95 minutes for 
the CU and CL treatments. At the end of each session, 1 ECU was exchanged for 0.05 AUD 
and earnings, rounded to the nearest dollar amount, were paid privately to each subject. On 
average, each participant earned $30 in CU and $29.70 in CL. 
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4.4. Results 
It is useful to reiterate the terminology used in this Chapter. Similarly to Chapter 3, at 
the river level, each river has an upstream and a downstream group and, at the group level, 
each upstream or downstream group has three farmers. In BL Phases 1 and 2 and CU Phase 2 
subjects played exactly the same step-level public goods game (SLPGG) with public 
information about endowments and without communication. Subjects played the game with 
communication and public information about endowments in CU Phase 1. In CL Phase 1, 
subjects played the game with communication and private information about endowments. 
CL Phase 2 differed from CL Phase 1 to the extent that subjects did not have the opportunity 
to communicate. Table 18 summarizes the games. Unless otherwise noted, tests for 
differences between samples are carried out by the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test. 
  Table 18. Summary of the designed games 
Treatment Phase 1 Phase 2 
BL SLPGG with public information and no communication 
Same as BL Phase 1 
CU SLPGG with public information and communication 
Same as BL Phase 1 
CL SLPGG with private information and communication 
SLPGG with private information 
and no communication 
4.4.1. Cooperation at river level 
A river is cleaned if both the upstream and downstream groups’ total contribution to 
wastewater treatment reaches the threshold of 30ECUs. Table 19 shows the percentage of 
times the rivers were cleaned. The percentage was similar for both Phases in each treatment. 
Notably, in the CU treatment, rivers were cleaned 100% of the time for each Phase (i.e., 10 
rivers were cleaned in each of 10 rounds of each Phase). Similar numbers were found for CL 
with 97% in Phase 1 and 99% in Phase 2. In more detail, in round 1 of CL Phase 1, 3 rivers 
were not cleaned due to either a low contribution of the upstream group or the downstream 
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group. Group messages revealed that one of the group members did not settle with the 
contribution suggested by the other members and hence contributed less than the others. 
Cooperation in both CL and CU was much higher than that in BL, indicating a huge impact 
of communication. 
  Table 19. Percentage of times a river got cleaned 
Treatment Phase 1 Phase 2  
BL 39%  41% 
CL 97% 99% 
CU 100% 100% 
 
The cooperative and non-cooperative payoffs are the same for the 2 Phases of each of 
the 3 treatments. Figures 11 and 12 show the average payoff per round and the average 
success per round, respectively. The cooperation level of farmers in BL Phase 1 (Figures 11a 
& 12b) started very low and improved but still reached a lower level at the end of the Phase 
compared to that in CU and CL Phase 1. In sharp contrast, cooperation in CU and CL began 
very high and remained stable to the end. In Phase 2 (Figures 11b & 12b), cooperation was 
stable at the level attained at the end of Phase 1 for the 3 treatments. Obviously, similar 
patterns were found for payoff measures. 
 
Figure 11. Mean payoffs (ECUs) per round for rivers   
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Figure 12. Mean success per round for rivers               
Result 1: Communication has a remarkable impact on cooperation, supporting Hypothesis 3. 
Table 20. River's payoff and success proportion 
Comparison Payoff Success proportion 
 (1) Z-statistic (2) P value (3) Z-statistic (4) P value 
(1) BL Phase 1 vs CL Phase 1 −3.614 0.0003*** −2.62 0.009*** 
(2) BL Phase 1 vs CL Phase 2 −3.684 0.0002*** −2.75 0.006*** 
(3) BL Phase 2 vs CL Phase 1 −2.811 0.0049*** −2.55 0.011** 
(4) BL Phase 2 vs CL Phase 2 −3.411 0.0006*** −2.67 0.007*** 
(5) BL Phase 1 vs CU Phase 1 −3.732 0.0002*** −2.93 0.003*** 
(6) BL Phase 1 vs CU Phase 2 −3.973 0.0001*** −2.93 0.003*** 
(7) BL Phase 2 vs CU Phase 1 −3.566 0.0004*** −2.86 0.004*** 
(8) BL Phase 2 vs CU Phase 2 −3.973 0.0001*** −2.86 0.004*** 
(9) CL Phase 1 vs CU Phase 1 −0.818 0.4134 −0.58 0.561 
(10) CL Phase 1 vs CU Phase 2 −2.289 0.0221** −0.58 0.561 
(11) CL Phase 2 vs CU Phase 1   0.495 0.6207 −0.33 0.738 
(12) CL Phase 2 vs CU Phase 2 −1.532 0.1256 −0.33 0.738 
(13) CL Phase 1 vs CL Phase 2^ −1.320 0.1867   0.00 1.000 
(14) CU Phase 1 vs CU Phase 2^ −1.983 0.0474**   
(15) BL Phase 1 vs BL Phase 2^ −1.481 0.1386 −0.10 0.923 
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%; ^Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Comparison of payoffs and success proportions between Phases of the 3 treatments 
are reported in Table 20. When comparing Phase 1 between the 3 treatments, farmers’ 
payoffs and success proportions in CU and CL were significantly higher than in BL (row (1) 
and (5)), suggesting cooperation increased with communication. This result was robust. As 
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shown in Figure 11a and 12a, by each round, payoffs and success proportions in CL and CU 
are higher than that in BL, which was also confirmed by means and proportions tests at a 1% 
significance level.   
Result 2:  Inconsistent with Hypothesis 5, with communication, there is no statistically 
significant difference in cooperation when farmers face public or private 
information about endowment.   
Testing the difference in payoffs and success proportions between CU Phase 1 and 
CL Phase 1 (Table 20, row (9)) shows that there were no differences for the 2 Phases, 
indicating that with communication, farmers facing full information about endowments 
cooperated as much as when they were facing limited information about the endowment. The 
cooperation level in round 1 in CL Phase 1 was significantly lower than that of CU Phase 1 (p 
= 0.047) but became identical to that of CU in round 2 to the end of Phase 1. This is an 
interesting result since subjects could have taken advantage of private information by lying 
about their endowment - understating their endowments - and hence contributing less and 
earning higher payoffs. We inspected the individual contributions and messages. There were 
no cases where one group member contributed less than others and the total contribution of 
the group just reached the threshold of 30ECUs. In other words, no asymmetric equilibrium 
occurred and, notably, no group member lied about his or her own endowment.  
Result 3: With communication it is possible for farmers to attain and sustain cooperative 
outcomes, supporting Hypothesis 4.  
Table 20 row (13) and Figures 11 and 12 show that farmers’ payoffs and success 
proportions are the same for the 2 Phases of CL, meaning that after attaining the full 
cooperation level in Phase 1, farmers continued this level for the 2 treatments in Phase 1. 
Once again, with private information and no communication in Phase 2, farmers were still 
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able to maintain the high level of cooperation attained at the end of Phase 1.  A similar result 
is found for CU but farmers slightly over-contributed in Phase 1 compared with Phase 2 
(Table 20, row (14)) but the over-contribution was of a negligible magnitude. Payoffs and 
success proportions in Phase 2 of CU and CL are also significantly higher than in Phase 1 of 
BL (Table 20, row (2) and (6)). Moreover, Figures 11b and 12b, and Table 20 row (4) and (8) 
show that payoffs and success proportions in CU and CL are significantly higher than in BL, 
suggesting communication has a long-lasting effect. In other words, results show that farmers 
sustain much higher cooperation levels with communication.  
4.4.2. Cooperation at group level 
Recall that 6 shrimp farmers (3 upstream and 3 downstream) form a river and 3 
shrimp farmers form either an upstream group or a downstream group of a river.  Having 
water of a river cleaned requires that both the upstream and the downstream group of the 
river contribute enough to wastewater treatment. Despite cooperation at river level is less 
likely to occur compared to that at group level, it is expected that cooperation at river and 
group level would have similar pattern since an upstream and a downstream group constitute 
a river. Thus this section would compare the behaviours of upstream and downstream groups. 
Figure 13 and 14 illustrate the average payoffs and success proportions for upstream and 
downstream groups in each Phase of each treatment. 
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Figure 13. Mean payoff (ECUs) per round for groups 
	  
Figure 14. Mean success per round for groups 
Obviously, the patterns are similar to that of rivers. Thus, communication has a 
positive effect on the cooperation level for both upstream and downstream groups and on the 
percentage of times a group’s contribution reaches the threshold (see Table 21). With 
communication, cooperation levels of groups were at or close to 100% (row (2) and (3)).  
Result 4: With communication, upstream and downstream groups outperform compared to 
that without communication in terms of payoffs and success proportions. 
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Table 21. Percentage of times a group's contribution reached the threshold 
Treatment Phase 1 Phase 2 
 (1) Up (2) Down (3) Up (4) Down 
(1) BL 54% 59% 59% 53% 
(2) CL 99% 98% 100% 99% 
(3) CU 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 22. Group's payoff and success proportion 
Comparison Payoff Success proportion 
 (1) Z-statistic (2) P value (3) Z-statistic (4) P value 
(1) BL Phase 1: down vs up −1.457 0.1451 −0.29 0.3877 
(2) BL Phase 2: down vs up −0.0928 0.3536 −0.52 0.3007 
(3) CL Phase 1: down vs up   1.735 0.0827*   0.18 0.854 
(4) CL Phase 2: down vs up   1.455 0.1456   0.32 0.751 
(5) CU Phase 1: down vs up −0.397 0.6911   
(6) BL P1 up vs CL P1 up −3.160 0.0016*** −2.23 0.026** 
(7) BL P1 down vs CL P1 down −3.595 0.0003*** −2.00 0.045** 
(8) BL P2 up vs CL P2 up −3.490 0.0005*** −2.16 0.031** 
(9) BL P2 down vs CL P2 down −3.231 0.0012*** −2.27 0.023** 
(10) BL P1 up vs CU P1 up −3.266 0.0011*** −2.41 0.016** 
(11) BL P1 down vs CU P1 down −3.636 0.0003*** −2.26 0.024** 
(12) BL P2 up vs CU P2 up −3.636 0.0003*** −2.26 0.024** 
(13) BL P2 down vs CU P2 down −3.975 0.0001*** −2.45 0.014** 
(14) CL P1 up vs CU P1 up   0.801 0.4230 −0.33 0.738 
(15) CL P1 down vs CU P1 down −1.841 0.0657* −0.47 0.636 
(16) CL P2 down vs CU P2 down −1.532 0.1256 −0.33 0.738 
(17) CL P1 up vs CL P2 up −1.000 0.3173 −0.32 0.751 
(18) CL P1 down vs CL P2 down  −1.356 0.1751 −0.18 0.854 
(19) CU P1 up vs CU P2 up −1.824 0.0682*   
(20) CU P1 down vs CU P2 down  −1.451 0.1468   
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
Payoffs and success proportions for upstream groups and downstream groups in CU 
and CL were significantly higher than those in BL (Table 22, row (6) to (13)), indicating that 
with communication farmers cooperated more and earned more income.   
Result 5: With communication, there are no significant differences in success proportions 
and payoff across groups. 
There were no significant differences in payoffs and success proportions between 
upstream and downstream groups for both Phases in CU (Table 22, row (5) and Table 21, 
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row (3)). CL had similar result except in Phase 1 in which upstream groups’ payoffs were 
marginally higher than downstream groups’ payoffs (Table 22, row (3) and (4)).   
Result 6: Similar to the river level, farmers have a strong possibility of self-governance at 
group level.  
There is no statistical difference in payoffs and success proportion for downstream 
groups between the 2 Phases and upstream groups between 2 Phases in CL treatment (Table 
22, row (17) and (18)). CU has similar pattern except payoffs of upstream groups in Phase 1 
are marginally lower than payoffs of upstream groups in Phase 2 (Table 22, row (19) and 
(20)).  
4.4.3. Messages 
There were no cases in which farmers violated the communication restrictions. 
Looking at the aggregate level, there was a dominant pattern of the messages for both CU and 
CL: farmers used communication as a tool to coordinate their contribution decisions in such a 
way that the whole group was better off. In addition, farmers in CL used communication to 
learn about others endowments prior to coordinating their contributions. All group members 
agreed to a contribution of 10ECUs each that is, some member suggested each to contribute 
10ECUs, resulting in additional payment of 20ECUs to each member of the group and other 
members agreed. Particularly, most groups managed to effectively coordinate themselves in 
contributions to wastewater treatment early in round 1 and this arrangement was maintained 
in the latter rounds. Nonetheless, in round 1 of CL, 3 groups did not reach the total 
contribution of 30ECUs as a result of one member’s no-response to the suggestion of 
contributing 10EUCs each from the other 2 members; the non-cooperating member 
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contributed less than 10ECUs. Notably, in CL Phase 1, no one lied about his or her 
endowment whatsoever.  
4.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that it is possible to use communication as a tool to overcome 
the coordination problem. Indeed, just pre-play communication alone internalized the 
externality. The results go in line with previous studies (e.g Cooper et al., 1992; Chan et al., 
1999; Blume and Ortmann, 2007; and Parkhurst et al., 2004).  That is, communication can 
help to overcome coordination failure and hence foster cooperation. In the same vein, it is 
also important to point out the findings of Cason and Gangadharan (2012). They examine 
experimentally the effect of communication on sellers’ coordination to fund a joint research 
project to reduce their costs, and on their pricing behaviour. Their results show that 
communication improves cooperation in all environments, particularly when the market is 
present. 
Cooperation levels are 100% in Phase 2 for CU and 99% for CL, significantly higher 
than in Phase 2 of BL. Notably, in Phase 2 of CL, even having private information about 
endowments, farmers still maintain the cooperation level attained at the end of Phase 1. In 
fact, since farmers learned that endowments shown on their screen were 20ECUs, the same as 
in Phase 1, it made sense for them to keep the contribution level as they did in Phase 1, 
especially at the end of Phase 1, and no one would have been better off by deviating. This 
behaviour was consistent with that in Phase 2 of BL and CU.  Similar results were also found 
by Ostrom et al. (1992), Guillen et al. (2006), and in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
Interestingly, with communication, private information did not reduce cooperation. 
Indeed, cooperation levels are found to be almost identical across CU and CL. None of the 
farmers lied about their private endowment information to seek higher gain. In fact, farmers 
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used communication as a tool to learn about other endowments and coordinate their 
contribution decisions in such a way that the whole group was better off. Given that 
endowments were the same among farmers, there are no opposing interests when all group 
members agree on a contribution of 10ECUs each. The result is consistent with and can be 
explained by Farrell and Rabin (1996) and Gneezy (2005) to the extent that subjects’ 
preferences are not conflictive; subjects are more prone to telling truth.  
In brief, the results show the salient effect of communication among laboratory 
shrimp farmers in solving the pollution problem. It is indeed very intuitive and should be 
explored further on real shrimp farmers. Wastewater dumped by a shrimp farmer will pollute 
the surrounding area and downstream area of the river system. Other farmers pump the 
polluted water for their growout, which negatively affects their production. The problem can 
hence be avoided if each of the farmers practises shrimp farming in a more responsible 
manner, that is each shrimp farmer need to treat wastewater appropriately before dumping it 
back to river system. This raises the need for coordination and cooperation of all shrimp 
farmers. Once laboratory shrimp farmers were able to communicate, they managed to 
cooperate effectively and sustained the cooperation level even when they no longer had a 
chance to communicate. It is thus in common interest of shrimp farmers to cooperate in 
solving the pollution problem. In achieving this, all farmers can practise a more responsible 
shrimp farming and hence enjoy a more sustainable shrimp production.  
Notably, even without the monitoring and certification agency proposed in Chapter 3, 
farmers attain an almost 100% cooperation level, suggesting communication works better 
than the MCA, which may be explained by the MCA itself being ineffective due to 
coordination failure.  The result is consistent with the Brandts and Cooper (2007) study of the 
effects of financial incentives and communication on coordination failures. Indeed, as Elinor 
Ostrom (1933-2012) said the day her Nobel Prize was announced: “What we have ignored is 
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what citizens can do and the importance of real involvement of the people involved – versus 
just having somebody in Washington ... make a rule.” The results thus suggest implementing 
community-based solutions to the problems facing shrimp farmers. However, to be successful 
at large scale level, it is suggested that farmers at smaller scale should be on trials that is they 
are brought together and informed about the pollution problem as well as suggested 
wastewater management. Since there are particular programs supported by Vietnamese 
government such as low interest loans targeted to promote shrimp farming, they can be used 
by farmers to invest in wastewater management. Indeed, Tran and Bush (2010) have found 
that shrimp farmers in the MRD have created some form of community-based solutions (e.g. 
cooperatives and farmer-cluster managements). 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION   
The aim of the thesis is to further understanding of the Vietnamese shrimp industry 
and to find ways for more sustainable shrimp production. The thesis has carried out an 
efficiency analysis of the three most common shrimp farming practices with particular focus 
on upstream-downstream externality of pollution. The thesis has also carried out an 
experimental study of various policy instruments to stimulate cooperative behaviour in 
solving the pollution problem.  
Overall, the empirical estimation with respect to group-frontier suggests that shrimp 
farmers in the Mekong Delta are not efficient. In other words, they use more inputs than 
technically necessary to produce any given level of output. Inefficient farmers could improve 
their productivity compared to their peers by reducing the amount of inputs used. This may 
reflect the dynamics of the interaction between shrimp farming and pollution. That is, shrimp 
farmers dump untreated wastewater into the river system that negatively affects shrimp 
production at other farms. Pollution not only forces farmers to use more chemicals to control 
water quality but also increases the likelihood that shrimp catch diseases and become 
contaminated with chemicals (e.g., antibiotics), which leads to higher production costs and a 
greater risk of failure. This is consistent with the Vo (2003) finding that shrimp farming plays 
a key role in determining overall quality in the food supply chain for exported shrimp 
products. Surprisingly, using a meta-frontier approach it is estimated that an average 
extensive shrimp farmer is more efficient than the average intensive farmer. This may be 
explained by the interactions of wastewater pollution and shrimp farming. Moreover, 
downstream farms are also affected more adversely by pollution compared to upstream 
counterparts. In brief, the findings of Chapter 2 suggest that current shrimp farming practices 
are not sustainable.   
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Wastewater pollution is a by-product of shrimp farming. It affects the surrounding 
environment as well as downstream water users. This negative externality is inevitable unless 
every shrimp farmer individually reduces pollution.  The results of BL treatment in Chapter 3 
suggest that it is possible for some group of farmers to achieve cooperation and sustain the 
cooperative level. However, at the aggregate level, the cooperation level is quite low due to 
strategic uncertainty about behaviour of other group members. It was also shown that it is 
possible to use an MCA as a rewarding and sanctioning agent to promote the cooperation of 
farmers in reducing the pollution. However, due to strategic uncertainty and loss aversion, the 
level of cooperation was found to be quite low. To reduce pollution to a sustainable level 
requires effort from each farmer. The incentive given by the MCA is not sufficient; 
coordination failure still exists with the result that full cooperation is not attained. Because 
pollution is only observed in the aggregate and not at the level of the individual farm, each 
farmer faces a risk. Given uncertainty about the treatment efforts of other farmers, individual 
farmers may be reluctant to invest in wastewater treatment, giving rise to a coordination 
problem. In brief, the results of Chapter 3 suggest that providing information to shrimp 
farmers and the MCA are not sufficient for full cooperation in the pollution problem to 
emerge among (laboratory) shrimp farmers.  
Experimental results in Chapter 4 show that when laboratory shrimp farmers are given 
an opportunity to communicate, the coordination problem is completely resolved even 
without the MCA. Indeed, cooperation levels were almost 100% when farmers were given 
complete information even with incomplete information about endowments. Farmers ended 
up with a nonbinding agreement and committed to it since they learnt that if a sufficient 
amount was invested in wastewater treatment, they all could earn higher profit and enjoy 
sustainable production. It was thus in their common interest to invest in wastewater 
treatment, and through communication farmers could eliminate any strategic uncertainty. 
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Interestingly, none of the farmers took advantage of incomplete information and 
communication to seek higher profit. 
Importantly, self-governance of the farmers appears to be possible, supported by 
findings in Chapter 3 and 4. The full cooperation level is observed even after the opportunity 
for communication is removed and even when farmers have only limited information about 
endowments. Strategic uncertainty no longer has a role since, once cooperation is attained, it 
pays for the farmers to maintain it: no farmer can decrease their wastewater cleaning effort 
without there being a detrimental overall effect on water quality.  
 In the context of the global agricultural food system, in addition to the usual forces of 
price and quantity, quality has emerged as a major force driving competition (Hatanaka and 
Busch, 2008). The new emphasis on quality requires a more environmentally responsible and 
quality-assured shrimp aquaculture. The cooperation of shrimp farmers is crucial to this 
development. The results show the robust effect of communication among laboratory shrimp 
farmers in solving the pollution problem. The findings are intuitively appealing and should be 
explored further on real shrimp farmers. The results in the thesis may be helpful to policy-
makers in designing and implementing community-based management practices in order to 
promote a sustainable shrimp aquaculture in Vietnam and elsewhere. The findings are also in 
line with cooperative development and farmer-cluster management practices, or community-
based management, which have recently been detected and encouraged by the Vietnamese 
government (Tran and Bush, 2010). In fact, each farmer practising shrimp farming in a 
responsible manner would not only solve the pollution problem but also provide room for 
productivity improvement, which is also a common interest of all shrimp farmers.  	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APPENDICES 
6.1. Chapter 2 
 
6.1.1. Maps of the two provinces 
 
	  
Figure 15. Map of Tra Vinh province 
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Figure 16. Map of Bac Lieu province 
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6.1.2. The Questionnaire  
	  
	  
	  
Mẫu	  số	  (sample	  number):……ngày	  (day)	  …	  tháng	  (month)	  …	  	  năm	  (year)	  2009	  
Người	  phỏng	  vấn	  (interviewer):	  ..................................................................................	  
Người	  được	  phỏng	  vấn	  (chủ	  hộ)	  (interviewee	  –household	  head):...............................	  
I.	  THÔNG	  TIN	  VỀ	  HỘ	  GIA	  ĐÌNH	  (HOUSEHOLD	  DEMOGRAPHIC	  INFORMATION)	  
Q1.	  Tuổi	  của	  chủ	  hộ	  (Age	  of	  household	  head)...................................................	  
Q2.	  Giới	  tính	  (Gender):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Nam	  (Male)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Nữ	  (Female)	  
Q3.	  Địa	  chỉ	  (Adress):	  xã	  (commune)...……….huyện	  (district)..………	  tỉnh	  (province)	  ….	  
Q4.	  Trình	  độ	  văn	  hoá	  (years	  of	  education):………………….	  
Q5.	  Số	  nhân	  khẩu	  (Number	  of	  family	  members):….....	  người	  (person).	  	  	  Trong	  đó	  (In	  
which):	  Nam	  (Male):……....	  Từ	  16	  tuổi	  trở	  lên	  (16	  years	  or	  above):…….	  Nữ	  (Female):	  
….......…..Từ	  16	  tuổi	  trở	  lên	  (16	  years	  or	  above):…..	  
Q6.	  Ông	  (bà)	  có	  được	  tập	  huấn	  về	  nuôi	  tôm	  không	  (Have	  you	  ever	  attended	  shrimp	  
farming	  training)?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Có	  (Yes)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Không	  (No)	  
Q7.	  Số	  khoá	  được	  tập	  huấn	  (Number	  of	  training	  attended):……..	  Bao	  lâu	  được	  tập	  
huấn	  một	  lần	  (how	  often)?	  ……	  tháng	  (month).	  
Đơn	  vị	  tập	  huấn	  (training	  provider):…...………...	  Hình	  thức	  tập	  huấn	  (purpose	  of	  
training):…....…...............……….	  
Q8.	  Mô	  hình	  nuôi	  hiện	  tại	  (mode	  of	  your	  current	  production):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Thâm	  canh	  
(intensive);	  	  	  	  	  	  Bán	  thâm	  canh	  (semi-­‐intensive);	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  QC	  cải	  tiến	  (extensive)	  	  	  	  
BẢNG CÂU HỎI ĐỐI VỚI NGƯỜI NUÔI TÔM 
(QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SHRIMP FARMER) 
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II.	  THÔNG	  TIN	  VỀ	  AO	  NUÔI	  (INFORMATION	  OF	  GROWOUT	  POND)	  
Q1.	  Tổng	  diện	  tích	  đất	  hiện	  nay	  (Total	  land	  area):………..............…(m2).	  
Q2.	  Trong	  đó,	  diện	  tích	  mặt	  nước	  nuôi	  tôm	  hiện	  nay	  (In	  which,	  total	  area	  of	  growout	  
water):……....…...........(	  m2).	  Đất	  sở	  hữu	  (owned	  land):…...…..(m2);	  Đất	  thuê	  (rented	  
land):….....(m2);	  Giá	  đất	  thuê	  (rent):....……(	  1.000	  đ/m2/năm	  (year)).	  
Q3.	  Bắt	  đầu	  nuôi	  tôm	  khi	  nào	  trên	  diện	  tích	  đất	  đang	  có	  (When	  did	  you	  start	  shrimp	  
farming	  on	  the	  current	  shrimp	  farming	  area)?	  	  Năm	  (year)…..........….	  
Q4.	  Diện	  tích	  đất	  nuôi	  tôm	  qua	  các	  năm	  (shrimp	  farming	  area	  by	  year):	  
Năm	  sản	  xuất	  (year)	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	  
Diện	  tích	  (area)	  
(1.000	  m2)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Q5.	  Ông	  (	  bà)	  vui	  lòng	  cho	  biết	  nguyên	  nhân	  tăng	  (giảm)	  diện	  tích	  nuôi	  tôm	  (Please	  
give	  reasons	  for	  changing	  shrimp	  farming	  area):	  
………..……………………………………………………..……………………………………………………………..	  
Q6.	  Tại	  sao	  lại	  chọn	  nuôi	  tôm	  (why	  choosing	  shrimp	  farming)?	  
(1)	  Nhiều	  LN	  hơn	  thủy	  sản	  khác	  (more	  profitable	  than	  other	  aquaculture	  practices	  	  
(2)	  Dễ	  bán	  sản	  phẩm	  (easy	  to	  sell)	  	  	  
(3)	  Điều	  kiện	  tự	  nhiên	  phù	  hợp	  (natural	  environment	  favourable)	   	  
(4)	  Có	  sẵn	  kinh	  nghiệm	  (experience)	  	   	  
(5)	  Nhà	  nước	  hỗ	  trợ	  về	  kỹ	  thuật,	  tài	  chính	  (financial	  and	  technical	  supports	  from	  the	  
government)	  
(6)	  Hưởng	  ứng	  phong	  trào	  (follow	  trend)	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(7)	  Sản	  lượng	  cao	  (high	  yield)	  
(8)	  Khác	  (chỉ	  rõ)	  (other,	  be	  specific):………….......................	  	  
Q7.	  Số	  vụ	  nuôi	  trong	  năm	  (number	  of	  crops	  per	  year):………….vụ	  (crop).	  
Q8.	  Ông/bà	  có	  ghi	  lại	  tất	  cả	  chi	  phí	  va	  thu	  nhập	  trong	  quá	  trình	  nuôi	  tôm	  (Do	  you	  
record	  all	  the	  costs	  and	  incomes	  during	  shrimp	  farming)?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Có	  (Yes)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Không	  (No)	  
III.	  CHI	  PHÍ	  VÀ	  THU	  NHẬP	  (COSTS	  AND	  INCOMES)	  (cho	  vụ	  gần	  đây	  nhất	  năm	  2008	  –	  
of	  the	  crop	  in	  2008)	  	  
Q1.	  Đầu	  tư	  xây	  dựng	  cơ	  bản	  và	  mua	  sắm	  máy	  móc	  thiết	  bị	  (investments	  on	  
infrastructures	  and	  machineries)	  (Tính	  cho	  -­‐	  per	  –	  1.000	  	  m2).	  
Hạng	  mục	  (item)	  	   Đơn	  vị	  
(unit)	  
Số	  lượng	  
(quantity)	  
Đơn	  giá	  
(price/unit)	  
Thành	  tiền	  
(total)(đ	  -­‐vnd)	  
1.	  Đào	  đấp	  nâng	  cấp	  ao	  (pond	  
preparation)	  	  
m3	   	   	   	  
2.	  Chòi	  quản	  lý	  (management	  
tent)	  
Cái	   	   	   	  
3.	  Máy	  bơm	  nước	  (water	  
pumper)	  
Bộ	   	   	   	  
4.	  Máy	  quạt	  nước	  (water	  aerial)	   Bộ	   	   	   	  
5.	  Hệ	  thống	  quạt	  (aerial	  
system)	  
Giàn	   	   	   	  
6.	  Trải	  bạt	  (sheet)	   m3	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7.	  Motor	   Cái	   	   	   	  
8.	  Dụng	  cụ	  theo	  dõi	  môi	  trường	  
nước	  (water	  quality	  measuring	  
tools)	  
Bộ	   	   	   	  
9.	  Khác	  (others):…..	   	   	   	   	  
Q2.	  Chi	  phí	  lao	  động	  (labor	  costs)	  (	  Tính	  cho	  -­‐per-­‐	  	  1.000	  m2)	  
Công	  việc	  (item)	  
Lao	  động	  nhà	  
(own	  labor)	  
Lao	  động	  thuê	  (hired	  labor)	  
Số	  ngày	  công	  
(day)	  
Số	  ngày	  
công	  (day)	  
Tiền	  công	  
	  (wage)	  
(đồng/ngày)	  
Thành	  
tiền	  
(total)	  
(đồng)	  
a.	  Sang	  sửa	  đáy	  ao	  và	  bờ	  
ao	  (pond	  preparation)	  
	   	   	   	  
b.	  Cho	  ăn,	  quản	  lý	  ao	  
nuôi	  (feeding	  and	  pond	  
management)	  
	   	   	   	  
c.	  Thu	  hoạch	  (harvesting)	   	   	   	   	  
d.	  Vận	  chuyển	  
(transporting)	  
	   	   	   	  
e.	  Khác	  (others)…..	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Q3.	  Chi	  phí	  giống,	  thức	  ăn,	  thuốc	  thủy	  sản,	  vật	  tư	  và	  thu	  hoạch	  (seeds,	  feeds,	  
fertilizers,	  fuels	  and	  harvesting)	  /	  vụ	  (crop)	  (Tính	  cho	  1.000	  m2).	  
Khoản	  mục	  (item)	   Số	  lượng	  (quantity)	   Đơn	  giá	  
(unit	  price)	  
Thành	  tiền	  
(total)	  (đồng)	  
a.	  Tôm	  giống	  (seeds)	   	   	   	  
b.	  Thức	  ăn	  viên	  
(manufactured	  feeds)	  
	   	   	  
c.	  Thức	  ăn	  tươi	  (fresh	  
feeds)	  
	   	   	  
d.	  Vôi	  (lime)	   	   	   	  
e.	  Thuốc	  thủy	  sản	  
(chemicals	  and	  
fertilizers)	  
Hàm	  lượng	  
(concentration)	  
Số	  lượng	  
(quantity)	  
Đơn	  giá	  
(unit	  price)	  
Thành	  tiền	  
(total)	  (đồng)	  
+	  	   	   	   	   	  
+	   	   	   	   	  
+	   	   	   	   	  
+	   	   	   	   	  
f.	  Vật	  tư	  (fuels)	   Số	  lượng	  (quantity)	   Đơn	  giá	  
(unit	  price)	  
Thành	  tiền	  
(total)	  (đồng)	  
1.	  Xăng,	  dầu	  (petro)	   	   	   	  
2.	  Điện	  (electricity)	   	   	   	  
3.	  Khác	  (others)	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Q4.	  Thông	  tin	  về	  sản	  lượng	  và	  thu	  nhập	  (yield	  and	  income)	  
Năng	  suất	  bq	  (yield)	  (kg/	  1.000m2)	   Tổng	  sản	  lượng	  (total	  yield)	  (kg)	  
	   	  
Thu	  nhập	  (income)	  
Thời	  điểm	  
bán	  (time	  of	  
selling)	  
Số	  lượng	  
(quantity)	  
(	  kg)	  
Giá	  bán	  
(unit	  price)	  
(đồng/kg)	  
Khách	  
hang	  
chính	  
(main	  
buyer)a	  
Thu	  nhập	  
khác	  
(other	  
income)	  
(đồng)	  
Ghi	  chú	  (note)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  a:	  	  (1)	  Người	  thu	  gom	  (collector);	  
	  	  	  	  	  (2)	  Thương	  buôn	  đường	  dài	  (middleman);	  
	  	  	  	  	  (3)	  Công	  ty	  chế	  biến	  (processing	  company);	  	  
	  	  	  	  (4)	  Trạm	  thu	  mua	  của	  nhà	  nước	  (government	  purchasing	  unit);	  
	  	  	  	  (5)	  Khác	  (other):	  ……………….	  
IV.	  HOẠT	  ĐỘNG	  MARKETING	  (MARKETING	  ACTIVITY)	  
Q1.	  Thông	  tin	  về	  người	  mua	  (information	  about	  buyer)	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1.1	  Địa	  chỉ	  người	  mua	  (buyer’s	  address)	  
Địa	  chỉ	  
(place)	  
Người	  thu	  
gom	  
(collector)	  
Thương	  buôn	  
đường	  dài	  
(middleman)	  
Công	  ty	  chế	  
biến	  
(processing	  
company)	  
Trạm	  thu	  mua	  
của	  NN	  
(government	  
purchasing	  
unit)	  
Khoảng	  cách	  
(distance)	  (km)	  
Cùng	  xã	  
(same	  
commune)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Cùng	  huyện	  
(same	  
district)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Cùng	  tỉnh	  
(same	  
province)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Khác	  tỉnh	  
(different	  
province):	  
	   	   	   	   	  
1.2	  Làm	  thế	  nào	  để	  thông	  báo	  cho	  người	  mua	  về	  việc	  bán	  (how	  to	  approach	  buyer)?	  
	   Người	  	  	  
thu	  gom	  
(collector)	  
Thương	  
buôn	  đường	  
dài	  
(middleman)	  
Công	  ty	  
chế	  biến	  
(processing	  
company)	  
Trạm	  thu	  
mua	  của	  NN	  
(government	  
purchasing	  
unit)	  
Điện	  thoại	  (telephone)	   	   	   	   	  
Người	  mua	  hỏi	  thăm	  
(approached	  by	  buyer)	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Mang	  đến	  nơi	  người	  
mua	  (come	  to	  buyer)	  
	   	   	   	  
Khác	  
(other)……………….	  
	   	   	   	  
1.3	  Phương	  thức	  thanh	  toán	  (payment	  method)	  
	   Người	  
thu	  gom	  
(collector)	  
Thương	  buôn	  
đường	  dài	  
(middleman)	  
Công	  ty	  chế	  
biến	  
(processing	  
company)	  
Trạm	  thu	  
mua	  của	  NN	  
(government	  
purchasing	  
unit)	  
a.	  Tiền	  mặt	  (cash)	   	   	   	   	  
b.	  Người	  mua	  ứng	  tiền	  
trước	  (partly	  deposit	  
from	  buyer)	  
	   	   	   	  
c.	  Trả	  chậm	  (late	  
payment)	  
	   	   	   	  
d.	  Khác	  (other)	   	   	   	   	  
Q2.	  Phương	  thức	  thanh	  toán	  đã	  áp	  dụng	  (payment	  method	  applied):	  
(1)	  Trả	  bằng	  tiền	  mặt	  (cash)	  
(2)	  Người	  mua	  ứng	  tiền	  trước	  (partly	  deposit	  from	  buyer)	  
Tại	  sao	  chọn	  cách	  này	  (why):…………………………………………………..............	  
(3)	  Trả	  chậm	  sau	  1-­‐	  2	  tuần	  (1-­‐2	  week	  later	  payment)	  
	  Tại	  sao	  chọn	  cách	  này	  (why):	  ...………………………………………...............……	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  (4)	  Khác	  (other):......................................................................................	  
Q3.	  Lý	  do	  bán	  cho	  người	  mua	  đã	  chọn	  (reasons	  for	  selling	  to	  the	  chosen	  buyer)	  
(1)	  Theo	  hợp	  đồng	  (contract)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2)	  Khách	  hàng	  thường	  xuyên/chính	  (regular/main	  buyer)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(3)	  Được	  chào	  giá	  cao	  (high	  price	  offered)	  
(4)	  Nhận	  tiền	  ứng	  trước	  từ	  người	  mua	  (advanced	  deposit	  from	  buyer)	  
(5)	  Khác	  (other):	  ………………..................	  
Q4.	  Lý	  do	  bán	  tại	  thời	  điểm	  đã	  nêu	  (reasons	  for	  selling	  at	  the	  time)	  
(1)	  Bán	  khi	  cần	  tiền	  để	  mua	  đầu	  vào	  (need	  money	  for	  buying	  inputs)	  
(2)	  Bán	  khi	  cần	  tiền	  để	  sinh	  hoạt	  gđ	  (need	  money	  for	  family	  reason)	  
(3)	  Bán	  khi	  người	  mua	  đến	  hỏi	  (approached	  by	  buyer)	  
(4)	  Đợi	  giá	  cao	  (wait	  for	  high	  price)	  
(5)	  Bán	  ngay	  sau	  thu	  hoạch	  (right	  after	  harvest)	  
(6)	  Khác	  (other):………....................…..	  	  
Q5.	  Ai	  là	  người	  định	  giá	  (who	  is	  the	  price	  setter)?	  
(1)	  Người	  mua	  (buyer)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2)	  Người	  bán	  	  (seller)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(3)	  Thoả	  thuận	  giữa	  hai	  bên	  (both	  buyer	  and	  seller)	  
(4)	  Dựa	  trên	  giá	  thị	  trường	  (market	  price)	  
Q6.	  Nguồn	  thông	  tin	  thị	  trường	  từ	  (sources	  of	  market	  information):	  
(1)	  Báo	  chí	  (magazine),	  radio,	  TV	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(2)	  Người	  thu	  gom,	  Thương	  buôn	  (collector,	  middleman)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(3)	  Cty	  chế	  biến,	  Trạm	  thu	  mua	  (processing	  company,	  purchasing	  unit)	  
(4)	  Bà	  con,	  xóm	  giềng,	  người	  quen	  (peers,	  neighbours,	  friends)	  	  
(5)	  Khác	  (other):	  ……………….............	  
V.	  THUẬN	  LỢI	  VÀ	  KHÓ	  KHĂN	  TRONG	  NUÔI	  VÀ	  TIÊU	  THỤ	  SẢN	  PHẨM	  (ADVANTAGES	  
AND	  DISADVANTAGES	  OF	  SHRIMP	  FARMING	  AND	  SELLING	  SHRIMP)	  	  
Q1.	  Những	  thuận	  lợi	  trong	  quá	  trình	  nuôi	  và	  tiêu	  thụ	  sản	  phẩm	  (advantages	  of	  
shrimp	  farming	  and	  selling	  shrimp):	  
(1)	  	  Điều	  kiện	  tự	  nhiên	  (natural	  environment)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2)	  	  Tiến	  bộ	  khoa	  học	  kỹ	  thuật	  (technology	  advancement	  )	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(3)	  	  Nguồn	  thức	  ăn	  dồi	  dào	  (variety	  of	  feed)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(4)	  	  Thuốc	  thủy	  sản	  (chemicals)	  
(5)	  	  Nhiều	  người	  mua	  (many	  buyers)	  
(6)	  	  Khác	  (others):……..................	  	  
Q2.	  Những	  khó	  khăn,	  khi	  tham	  gia	  nuôi	  tôm	  sú	  (disadvantages	  of	  shrimp	  farming):	  
(1)	  	  Thiếu	  vốn	  đầu	  tư	  (shortage	  of	  investment	  capital)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2)	  	  Giá	  cả	  đầu	  vào	  cao	  (high	  input	  prices)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(3)	  	  Thiếu	  giống	  (seed	  shortage)	  	  
(4)	  	  Dịch	  bệnh	  (diseases)	  
(5)	  	  Khác	  (others):……...............…	  	  
Q3.	  Những	  khó	  khăn	  trong	  việc	  tiêu	  thụ	  sản	  phẩm	  (disadvantages	  of	  selling	  shrimp):	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(1)	  Thiếu	  thông	  tin	  về	  người	  mua	  (lack	  information	  about	  buyer)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2)	  Thiếu	  thông	  tin	  về	  thị	  trường	  (lack	  information	  about	  market)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(3)	  Hệ	  thống	  GTVT	  yếu	  kém	  (poor	  transportation	  system)	  	  
(4)	  Giá	  cả	  biến	  động	  nhiều	  (price	  fluctuation)	  
(5)	  Người	  mua	  độc	  quyền	  (monopoly	  buyer)	  
(6)	  Khác	  others)……….........…	  	  
Q4.	  Trong	  tương	  lai,	  để	  kiếm	  được	  lợi	  nhuận	  cao	  hơn,	  ông	  bà	  đề	  nghị	  gì	  (In	  the	  
future,	  to	  have	  higher	  profit,	  what	  do	  you	  suggest)?	  
A.	  Thị	  trường	  (market):……………………………………………….....…………………….	  
……………………………………………………………………………….....….	  
B.	  Thể	  chế,	  chính	  sách	  (government	  institution	  and	  policy):	  
………………………………………………………….....……………………….…………...................................
...............................................................................	  
C.	  Khác	  (other):	  …………………………………………………………………………………......	  
……………………………………………………………………………………..	  
VI.	  TÍN	  DỤNG	  (FINANCING):	  
Q1.	  Ông	  bà	  có	  thể	  tiếp	  cận	  được	  vốn	  vay	  từ	  ngân	  hàng	  không	  (Do	  you	  have	  access	  to	  
credit	  finance	  from	  banks)?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Có	  (yes)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Không	  (no)	  
Q2.	  Vui	  lòng	  cho	  biết	  thông	  tin	  về	  những	  khoản	  vay	  ngân	  hàng	  năm	  qua	  (Please	  give	  
detail	  about	  your	  loan	  in	  previous	  year)?	  
	   Ngân	   Số	  tiền	   Khi	  nào	   Thời	  hạn	   Lãi	  suất	   Mục	  đích	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hang	  
nào	  
(what	  
bank)?	  
(amount)	  
(	  đồng)	  
(when)?	   vay	  (duration)	  
(tháng/month)	  
(interest	  
rate)	  
(%)	  
Vay	  
(purpose)	  
a.	  Lần	  1	  
(first	  
time)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
b.	  Lần	  2	  
(second	  
time)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Q3.	  Ông	  bà	  có	  gặp	  khó	  khăn	  gì	  khi	  vay	  ngân	  hàng	  không	  (do	  you	  have	  any	  difficulty	  in	  
getting	  loans)?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Có	  (yes)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Không	  (no)	  
Nếu	  có,	  vui	  lòng	  nêu	  rõ	  (If	  yes,	  please	  give	  detail):	  ……………………………………………	  
…………………………………………………………………………………..…………………………………….	  
Q4.	  Ông	  bà	  có	  đề	  nghị	  gì	  về	  ngân	  hàng	  (Do	  you	  have	  any	  suggestions	  to	  the	  banks)?:	  
…………………………………………………………………………………….….…………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..	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Q5.	  Vui	  lòng	  cho	  biết	  thông	  tin	  về	  những	  khoảng	  vay	  tư	  nhân	  trong	  năm	  qua	  (Please	  
give	  detail	  about	  loans	  from	  private	  owners	  last	  year)	  
Loại	  
(type)	  
Nguồn	  
Nào	  
(what	  
sources)?	  
Số	  tiền	  
(amount)	  
(đồng)	  
Khi	  
Nào	  
(when)?	  
Thời	  hạn	  
(duration)	  
(tháng/month)	  
Lãi	  suất	  
(interest	  
rate)	  
(%)	  
Mục	  đích	  
vay	  
(purpose)	  
a.	  Lần	  1	  
(first	  
time)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
b.	  Lần	  2	  
(second	  
time)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Q6.	  Tại	  sao	  ông	  bà	  vay	  từ	  nguồn	  này	  (why	  did	  you	  get	  loan	  from	  private	  owners?	  
……………………………………………………………………………………..	  
Q7.	  Ông	  bà	  có	  gặp	  khó	  khăn	  gì	  khi	  vay	  từ	  	  những	  nguồn	  này	  (did	  you	  have	  any	  
difficulty)?	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Có	  (yes)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Không	  (no)	  
Nếu	  có,	  chỉ	  rõ	  (if	  yes,	  please	  specify:	  ……………………………………………………………..…………	  
Xin	  chân	  thành	  cảm	  ơn	  sự	  cộng	  tác	  của	  Ông	  (Bà)	  (Thank	  you	  for	  your	  
cooperation)!	  
	  
Người	  được	  phỏng	  vấn	  (interviewee)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Người	  phỏng	  vấn	  (interviewer)	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6.2. Chapter 3  
 
6.2.1 Instructions for BL Phase 1, 2 and FF Phase 2 
This is an experiment about economic decision making. Any kind of communication between 
you and other participants is not permitted once you read these instructions until the end of 
the experiment.  
The experiment consists of 2 Phases and a Questionnaire. If you read the instructions 
carefully you can earn a significant amount of money. Your earnings will be paid to you in 
cash at the end of the experiment. 
Each of you will act as a prawn farmer. Your prawn farm is located in a river. Each river has 
6 farms placed evenly either in the upstream group or in the downstream group, meaning that 
there are 3 farms in the upstream group as well as 3 farms in the downstream group on each 
river. A computer will randomly decide whether you are an upstream or a downstream 
farmer. Once your farm is assigned to a group in a particular river it will remain there until 
the end of this Phase. That is, you will interact with the same upstream and downstream 
farmers until the end of this Phase. 
Too much pollution from yours and others’ farms negatively affects your production and the 
production of others in your group (either upstream or downstream). On top of that, the 
polluted water coming from the upstream farms also negatively affects the production of 
downstream farms. Therefore upstream farms are only negatively affected by the pollution 
generated upstream, but downstream farms are negatively affected by both the pollution 
generated upstream and downstream.  Pollution can only be avoided by farmers investing on 
wastewater treatment.  
There are 10 rounds in this Phase. At the beginning of each round, each farm will be 
endowed with 20 Experimental Currency Units or ECUs. You must decide how many ECUs 
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to contribute to wastewater treatment. In order to make your decision you must take into 
account that: 
(1) Your contribution towards wastewater treatment (Wi) must be an integer between 0 
and 20ECUs. You keep for yourself the amount you don’t contribute to wastewater 
treatment. 
(2) If the total contribution to wastewater treatment of your group (SW) is equal or 
greater than 30ECUs, each group member gets an additional 20ECUs payment. 
Otherwise, if the total contribution to wastewater treatment of your group (SW) is 
lower than 30ECUs, no group member receives any additional payment. 
(3) For each river, if the total contribution of the upstream group is at least 30ECUs, the 
downstream group will not be affected by pollution produced upstream; otherwise, if 
the total contribution of the upstream group is lower than 30ECUs each member of 
the downstream group will be affected, so individual payoffs will decrease by 
10ECUs. 
Therefore, payoffs for each round can be summarised as follows: 
  For an upstream group farmer: !!! = 20−!! + !!   
For a downstream group farmer:  !!! = 20−!! + !! − !!"  
where πi represents your payoff, Wi represents your contribution to wastewater treatment, Rw 
represents the possible additional payment and Rup represents the possible effect of pollution 
generated upstream to downstream farmers, that is: 
       !! = 20, !"  !" ≥ 30                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      0, !"ℎ!"#$%!                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          !!" = 0, !"  !ℎ!  !"!#$  !"#$%&'($&"#   !" !"  !ℎ!  !"#$%&'(  !"#$%  !"  !"  !"#$%  3010, !"ℎ!"#$%!                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
After each round you will be informed of your payoff (πi), your accumulated payoff, your 
contribution to wastewater treatment (Wi), the total contribution of your group to wastewater 
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treatment (SW), and your additional payment (Rw). Downstream farmers will be also 
informed of the possible effect of pollution generated upstream to downstream farmers (Rup).   
You will receive 5 cent of AUD per ECU. Your final payment will be rounded to the nearest 
dollar amount. If you have any doubt you may raise your hand now or during the experiment. 
An experimenter will come to help you. 
6.2.2. Instructions for FF Phase 1 
This is an experiment about economic decision making. Any kind of communication between 
you and other participants is not permitted once you read these instructions until the end of 
the experiment.  
The experiment consists of 2 Phases and a Questionnaire. If you read the instructions 
carefully you can earn a significant amount of money. Your earnings will be paid to you in 
cash at the end of the experiment. 
Each of you will act as a prawn farmer. Your prawn farm is located in a river. Each river has 
6 farms placed evenly either in the upstream group or in the downstream group, meaning that 
there are 3 farms in the upstream group as well as 3 farms in the downstream group on each 
river. A computer will randomly decide whether you are an upstream or a downstream 
farmer. Once your farm is assigned to a group in a particular river it will remain there until 
the end of this Phase. That is, you will interact with the same upstream and downstream 
farmers until the end of this Phase. 
Too much pollution from yours and others’ farms negatively affects your production and the 
production of others in your group (either upstream or downstream). On top of that, the 
polluted water coming from the upstream farms also negatively affects the production of 
downstream farms. Therefore upstream farms are only negatively affected by the pollution 
generated upstream, but downstream farms are negatively affected by both the pollution 
generated upstream and downstream.  Pollution can only be avoided by farmers investing on 
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wastewater treatment. Pollution levels will be overseen by a Monitoring and Certification 
Agency (MCA). The MCA measures the pollution generated by each group (either upstream 
or downstream) and informs prawn consumers by adding a seal to each prawn box. The MCA 
is provided for a fixed fee (F = 3) to prawn farmers. 
There are 10 rounds in this Phase. At the beginning of each round, each farm will be 
endowed with 20 Experimental Currency Units or ECUs. You must decide how many ECUs 
to contribute to wastewater treatment. In order to make your decision you must take into 
account that: 
(1) Your contribution towards wastewater treatment (Wi) must be an integer between 0 
and 20ECUs. You keep for yourself the amount you don’t contribute to wastewater 
treatment. 
(2) If the total contribution to wastewater treatment of your group (SW) is equal or 
greater than 30ECUs the MCA will add a low pollution seal, and each group member 
gets an additional 23ECUs payment. Otherwise, if the total contribution to wastewater 
treatment of your group (SW) is lower than 30ECUs the MCA will add a high 
pollution seal, and each group member gets an additional (- 4ECUs) payment. 
(3) For each river, if the total contribution of the upstream group is at least 30ECUs, the 
downstream group will not be affected by pollution produced upstream; otherwise, if 
the total contribution of the upstream group is lower than 30ECUs each member of 
the downstream group will be affected, so individual payoffs will decrease by 
10ECUs. 
Therefore, payoffs for each round can be summarised as follows: 
  For an upstream group farmer: !!! = 20−!! + !! − !  
For a downstream group farmer:  !!! = 20−!! + !! − ! − !!"  
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where πi represents your payoff, Wi represents your contribution to wastewater treatment, Rw 
represents the possible additional payment, F represents the fixed fee, and Rup represents the 
possible effect of pollution generated upstream to downstream farmers, that is:         
 !! = 23, !"  !" ≥ 30                                                                                                                                                                                                                                −4, !"ℎ!"#$%!                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 F = 3     
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After each round you will be informed of your payoff (πi), your accumulated payoff, your 
contribution to wastewater treatment (Wi), the total contribution of your group to wastewater 
treatment (SW), and your additional payment (Rw). Downstream farmers will be also 
informed of the possible effect of pollution generated upstream to downstream farmers (Rup).  
You will receive 5 cent of AUD per ECU. Your final payment will be rounded to the nearest 
dollar amount. If you have any doubt you may raise your hand now or during the experiment. 
An experimenter will come to help you. 
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6.3. Chapter 4 
6.3.1. Instructions for CU Phase 1 [Phase 2 with <…> removed] 
This is an experiment about economic decision making. Any kind of communication between 
you and other participants is not permitted once you read these instructions until the end of 
the experiment <(EXCEPT when you are allowed to communicate via chat room)>. The 
experiment consists of 2 Phases and a Questionnaire. If you read the instructions carefully 
you can earn a significant amount of money. Your earnings will be paid to you privately in 
cash at the end of the experiment. 
This is Phase 1 [Phase 2] 
Each of you will act as a prawn farmer. Your prawn farm is located in a river. Each river has 
6 farms placed evenly either in the upstream group or in the downstream group, meaning that 
there are 3 farms in the upstream group as well as 3 farms in the downstream group on each 
river. A computer will randomly decide whether you are an upstream or a downstream 
farmer. Once your farm is assigned to a group in a particular river it will remain there until 
the end of this Phase. That is, you will interact with the same upstream and downstream 
farmers until the end of this Phase. 
Too much pollution from yours and others’ farms negatively affects your production and the 
production of others in your group (either upstream or downstream). On top of that, the 
polluted water coming from the upstream farms also negatively affects the production of 
downstream farms. Therefore upstream farms are only negatively affected by the pollution 
generated upstream, but downstream farms are negatively affected by both the pollution 
generated upstream and downstream.  Pollution can only be avoided by farmers investing on 
wastewater treatment.  
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There are 10 rounds in this Phase. At the beginning of each round, each farm will be 
endowed with 20 Experimental Currency Units or ECUs. You must decide how many ECUs 
to contribute to wastewater treatment. <Prior to making your decision, you will be given 2 
minutes to communicate with the other 2 members of your group by sending messages to the 
chat room. Please do not identify yourself by name, PC number or appearance. Other than 
these restrictions, you may discuss anything you wish with the other group members.> 
Finally, in order to make your decision you must take into account that: 
(4) Your contribution towards wastewater treatment (Wi) must be an integer between 0 
and 20ECUs. You keep for yourself the amount you don’t contribute to wastewater 
treatment. 
(5) If the total contribution to wastewater treatment of your group (SW) is equal or 
greater than 30ECUs, each group member gets an additional 20ECUs payment. 
Otherwise, if the total contribution to wastewater treatment of your group (SW) is 
lower than 30ECUs, no group member receives any additional payment. 
(6) For each river, if the total contribution of the upstream group is at least 30ECUs, the 
downstream group will not be affected by pollution produced upstream; otherwise, if 
the total contribution of the upstream group is lower than 30ECUs each member of 
the downstream group will be affected, so individual payoffs will decrease by 
10ECUs. 
Therefore, payoffs for each round can be summarised as follows: 
  For an upstream group farmer: !!! = 20−!! + !!   
For a downstream group farmer:  !!! = 20−!! + !! − !!"  
where πi represents your payoff, Wi represents your contribution to wastewater treatment, Rw 
represents the possible additional payment and Rup represents the possible effect of pollution 
generated upstream to downstream farmers, that is: 
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At the end of each round you will be informed of your payoff (πi), your accumulated payoff, 
your contribution to wastewater treatment (Wi), the total contribution of your group to 
wastewater treatment (SW), and your additional payment (Rw). Downstream farmers will be 
also informed of the possible effect of pollution generated upstream to downstream farmers 
(Rup).   
You will receive 5 cent of AUD per ECU. Your earnings will be rounded to the nearest dollar 
amount. If you have any doubt you may raise your hand now or during the experiment. An 
experimenter will come to help you. 
6.3.2. Instructions for CL Phase 1 [Phase 2 with <…> removed] 
 
This is an experiment about economic decision making. Any kind of communication between 
you and other participants is not permitted once you read these instructions until the end of 
the experiment <(EXCEPT when you are allowed to communicate via chat room)>. The 
experiment consists of 2 Phases and a Questionnaire. If you read the instructions carefully 
you can earn a significant amount of money. Your earnings will be paid to you privately in 
cash at the end of the experiment. 
This is Phase 1 [Phase 2] 
Each of you will act as a prawn farmer. Your prawn farm is located in a river. Each river has 
6 farms placed evenly either in the upstream group or in the downstream group, meaning that 
there are 3 farms in the upstream group as well as 3 farms in the downstream group on each 
river. A computer will randomly decide whether you are an upstream or a downstream 
farmer. Once your farm is assigned to a group in a particular river it will remain there until 
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the end of this Phase. That is, you will interact with the same upstream and downstream 
farmers until the end of this Phase. 
Too much pollution from yours and others’ farms negatively affects your production and the 
production of others in your group (either upstream or downstream). On top of that, the 
polluted water coming from the upstream farms also negatively affects the production of 
downstream farms. Therefore upstream farms are only negatively affected by the pollution 
generated upstream, but downstream farms are negatively affected by both the pollution 
generated upstream and downstream.  Pollution can only be avoided by farmers investing on 
wastewater treatment.  
There are 10 rounds in this Phase. At the beginning of each round, each farm will be given an 
endowment in Experimental Currency Units or ECUs. Your endowment will be shown on 
your computer screen. You never know others’ endowment nor do others know your 
endowment. You must decide how many ECUs to contribute to wastewater treatment. <Prior 
to making your decision, you will be given 2 minutes to communicate with the other 2 
members of your group by sending messages to the chat room. Please do not identify yourself 
by name, PC number or appearance. Other than these restrictions, you may discuss anything 
you wish with the other group members.> 
Finally, in order to make your decision you must take into account that: 
(1) Your contribution towards wastewater treatment (Wi) (in ECUs) must be an integer 
between 0 and your endowment. You keep for yourself the amount you don’t 
contribute to wastewater treatment. 
(2) If the total contribution to wastewater treatment of your group (SW) is equal or 
greater than 30ECUs, each group member gets an additional 20ECUs payment. 
Otherwise, if the total contribution to wastewater treatment of your group (SW) is 
lower than 30ECUs, no group member receives any additional payment. 
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(3) For each river, if the total contribution of the upstream group is at least 30ECUs, the 
downstream group will not be affected by pollution produced upstream; otherwise, if 
the total contribution of the upstream group is lower than 30ECUs each member of 
the downstream group will be affected, so individual payoffs will decrease by 
10ECUs. 
Therefore, payoffs for each round can be summarised as follows: 
  For an upstream group farmer: !!! = !! −!! + !!   
For a downstream group farmer:  !!! = !! −!! + !! − !!"  
where πi represents your payoff, Ei represents your endowment, Wi represents your 
contribution to wastewater treatment, Rw represents the possible additional payment and Rup 
represents the possible effect of pollution generated upstream to downstream farmers, that is: 
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At the end of each round you will be informed of your payoff (πi), your accumulated payoff, 
your contribution to wastewater treatment (Wi), the total contribution of your group to 
wastewater treatment (SW), and your additional payment (Rw). Downstream farmers will be 
also informed of the possible effect of pollution generated upstream to downstream farmers 
(Rup).   
You will receive 5 cent of AUD per ECU. Your earnings will be rounded to the nearest dollar 
amount. If you have any doubt you may raise your hand now or during the experiment. An 
experimenter will come to help you. 
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